Three Transnational Discourses of Labor Law in Domestic Reform by Santos, Alvaro
SANTOS.DOC 11/23/2010 3:55 PM 
 
123 
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DOMESTIC REFORMS 
ALVARO SANTOS* 
ABSTRACT 
Current labor law debates, in the United States and elsewhere, 
reflect entrenched discursive positions that make potential reform 
seem impossible.  This Article identifies and examines the three 
most influential positions, which it names the “social,” “the neoli-
beral,” and the “rights-based” approach.  It shows that these dis-
cursive positions are truly transnational in character.  In contrast 
with conventional wisdom, which accepts the incompatibility of 
these positions, this Article creates a conceptual framework that 
productively combines elements from each to enrich the debates 
over labor law reform and to foster institutional imagination.  Ap-
plying this framework, the Article examines the collective bargain-
ing systems of the United States and Mexico comparatively.  It illu-
strates how the Mexican labor law regime could embrace the 
democratic aspirations of the rights-based position (dominant in 
the United States) without eliminating labor rules that facilitate col-
lective bargaining.  In contrast, the American labor law regime 
could embrace the aspirations of the social position (dominant in 
Mexico) to ease workers’ organization and facilitate collective bar-
gaining, without undermining the system’s democratic character.  
This analysis draws attention to possibilities that have been forec-
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losed in each country and, by showing how they have been opened 
up elsewhere, suggests potential alternatives for institutional expe-
rimentation in domestic reform. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis has brought the question of employ-
ment front and center.  With record high unemployment rates, 
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there is consensus about the need to create jobs and help em-
ployees who have slipped out of the labor market.  This includes 
asserting a role for the state in creating jobs that we have not seen 
in decades.  Beyond this short-term consensus, however, there is 
still a gulf between economic actors’ positions about how to best 
regulate our labor markets. 
This Article posits that the current economic crisis should be 
taken as an opportunity to rethink our labor market institutions.  
As a first step, the crisis should give us an occasion to reexamine 
the entrenched positions in the debate about labor regulation.  
Consider the debate about the Employee Free Choice Act 
(“EFCA”),1 with actors advancing positions that seem not only con-
flicting, but also irreducible.  Both unions and employers advance 
their cause as a democratic one and tout each other as undemocrat-
ic.  Employers depict unions as wanting to introduce coercive prac-
tices that would deprive workers of their right to privately vote 
whether they want a union.2  Unions depict employers as perpe-
trating a system where workers cannot freely organize.3  Each of 
these actors also advances their position as the most economically 
beneficial for the country.4 
 
1 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).  The Em-
ployee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”) proposes to amend the National Labor Relations 
Act to eliminate the secret-ballot election in favor of card-check certification. The 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) would recognize a union when the ma-
jority of employees have signed authorization cards designating the union as their 
representative.  The bill also provides for first contract mediation or arbitration in 
case of disagreement and increased penalties to employers who engage in unfair 
labor practices. 
2 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has strongly opposed the EFCA on the 
grounds that forcing workers to sign a card in public—instead of voting in pri-
vate—opens the door to intimidation and coercion.  See LABOR, IMMIGRATION & 
EMP. BENEFITS DIV., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT: 
PIERCING THE RHETORIC 13 (2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com 
/reports/employee-free-choice-act-piercing-rhetoric (“Should EFCA become law, 
the level and severity of union misconduct may be expected to increase dramati-
cally—union cards would be the first, last and only method required for a union 
to gain certification, the ‘be all end all’ for unions.”). 
3 The AFL-CIO issued a statement in support of EFCA and warned against 
“corrupt, corporate bullies,” who “have always opposed workers’ rights, free-
doms and advancement.”  Press Release, AFL-CIO Exec. Council, Emp. Free 
Choice Act (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca 
/executive_council_03-2009.cfm. 
4 The AFL-CIO argues: 
EFCA would restore workers’ freedom to form unions and bargain by 
enabling workers to form unions without the fear, delay and coercion in-
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The tensions evident in the debate about EFCA are not unique 
to the United States.  The global economy has forced governments 
to think hard about how to reform their market and state institu-
tions to better deal with the challenges posed by global competi-
tion.  What, in this global economic context of flexible modes of 
production, should be the role of collective bargaining and protec-
tive labor standards?  The recent economic crisis has merely ex-
acerbated and brought these tensions more clearly to the surface all 
around the globe. 
This Article provides a conceptual framework to understand 
current labor law debates.  It examines three historically pervasive 
discursive positions that often frame and limit how the debate over 
labor regulation takes place.  I call these rhetorical positions the 
“social,” the “neoliberal,” and the “rights-based” positions.  The 
“social” position stands for the defense of current employment 
protection and labor standards as a matter of national sovereignty, 
cultural pride, and inherently progressive politics.  The “neoliber-
al” position seeks to reform labor and employment legislation and 
introduce particular forms of flexibility deemed required by global 
economic competition.  Finally, the “rights-based” position pro-
poses to weaken the institutions of collective bargaining to pro-
mote individual rights that are considered inherent to democracy. 
This Article shows that these positions exist and operate at the 
transnational level.  There is a surprising similarity in the rhetoric 
used in diverse parts of the world to advance or to resist changes to 
their labor market institutions.  This is true in the developed world 
as it is in the developing one.  This similarity can be attributed to 
the transnational actors who promote each position.  The social po-
sition has been traditionally advocated by the International Labour 
Organization (“ILO”), which was created after World War I to ad-
dress the labor question in the face of industrialization.  The ILO 
stands today as a unique, corporatist, international organization 
where each member-state is not represented solely by its govern-
 
herent in our current system.  Majority sign-up is a long-established way 
to form a union, dating back to passage of the National Labor Relations 
Act.  It is a process that allows workers to decide whether to form a un-
ion without the fear and coercion endemic in the current National Labor 
Relations Act process.  It is used today by major employers, such as 
AT&T and Harley-Davidson, as an important part of their successful 
high-road business plans. 
Key Facts, Employee Free Choice Act, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion 
/voiceatwork/efca/10keyfacts.cfm (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).  
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ment but also by representatives of workers and employers.  With 
numerous conventions and declarations, the ILO has stood for the 
protection and advancement of workers’ welfare around the 
world.5 
The neoliberal position has been advanced by international fi-
nancial institutions (“IFIs”) like the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (“IMF”), as well as international organiza-
tions like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”).  The primary objective of this position 
has been to promote a particular form of flexibility in labor mar-
kets in order to promote job creation, reduce unemployment, and 
foster economic growth. 6 
Finally, the rights-based position has been promoted by inter-
national non-governmental organizations, and has aimed to re-
conceptualize labor rights as fundamental individual human rights 
that should enjoy universal observance.7  The ILO has also forceful-
ly embraced an individual rights-based approach in the form of a 
 
5 For more on the ILO’s mission and organization, see About the ILO, INT’L 
LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2010).  For an account of the ILO’s history and recent changes, 
see Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globa-
lization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649 (2006). 
6 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD JOBS STUDY: 
EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS AND FACTS, ANALYSIS STRATEGIES 69 (1994) (discuss-
ing the importance of “labour market flexibility” for economic performance); ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD JOBS STUDY: FACTS, ANALYSIS, 
STRATEGIES 2f (1994), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/51 /1941679.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (advocating working-time and labor cost flexibility as a 
strategy for growth). 
7 See Virginia A. Leary, The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22, 22–43 (Lance A. 
Compa and Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (exploring the different positions tak-
en by human rights activists and trade unionists on workers’ rights).  For exam-
ples of NGOs treating workers’ rights as human rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT: A HUMAN RIGHTS IMPERATIVE (Jan. 27, 
2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en /reports/2009/01/27/united-states-
employee-free-choice-act; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS (Jan. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/01/24 /blood-sweat-and-fear.  See also 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DOCUMENT: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AT WORK: AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS TO THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE (4-20 JUNE 
2002, GENEVA), IOR 42/001/2002 (Apr. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR42/001/2002 (addressing forced 
labor, discrimination, child labor, freedom of association and other country-
specific labor concerns as human rights).  
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“core” labor rights agenda.8  On their part, the IFIs have recog-
nized the importance of most core labor rights and deemed them to 
be compatible with the labor flexibility agenda.9 
These positions are also visible in the debates about labor, mar-
ket regulation, and human rights in Europe.10  The European Court 
of Justice has recently had to deal with a series of very contentious 
cases illuminating the tensions between fundamental market free-
doms (promoted by neoliberals), such as freedom of movement, 
and a country’s regulation enabling its unions to protect their in-
terests against non-union and foreign workers (endorsed by the so-
cial position).11  In addition, the European Court of Human Rights 
 
8 See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO (June 
18, 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration 
/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (setting out member states’ commitment to 
the values of freedom of association and collective bargaining, and the eradication 
of forced labor, child labor, and discrimination).  For a critical examination of the 
ILO agenda and the relationship between labor rights and fundamental human 
rights, see generally LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
9 See Kerry Rittich, Core Labor Rights and Labor Market Flexibility: Two Paths 
Entwined?, in LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS: ADR AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF LABOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 157, 160 (Int’l Bureau of the Perm. Court of Arbitra-
tion ed., 2003).  For an analysis of the treatment of human rights by international 
financial institutions, see Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human 
Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996).  See also Balakrishnan Raja-
gopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the IMF and 
Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81 (1993) (assessing the role and function of the 
IMF and its impact on human rights).  
10 A 2006 Green Paper by the European Commission invited the reactions of 
a broad range of participants in labor market regulation.  See Commission Green 
Paper on Modernising Labor Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, at 3, COM 
(2006) 708 final (Nov. 11, 2006) (“The purpose of this Green Paper is to launch a 
public debate in the EU on how labour law can evolve to support the Lisbon 
Strategy's objective of achieving sustainable growth with more and better jobs.”).  
Most parties involved welcomed the initiative but employee unions highly ob-
jected to the Green Paper’s characterization of steady employment as inflexible.  
Employer representative bodies thought that flexibility had been given a negative 
connotation.  See Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper 
“Modernising Labor Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, SEC (2007) 1373 
final (Oct. 24, 2007) (“Many employer bodies at EU, sectoral and national levels, 
while sharing many of the concerns put forward by the Green Paper, considered, 
however, that it had taken an overly negative view of flexible forms of work.”). 
11 The Court of Justice of the European Union has recognized the fundamen-
tal right of workers to take collective action; however this right is limited by the 
freedom of establishment under Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”) and the freedom to provide services under Article 56 
of TFEU such that labor activity “restriction[s] . . . [must be] suitable for ensuring 
the attainment of the legitimate objective pursued [e.g. public policy such as 
workers rights] and [should] not go further than what is necessary to achieve that 
objective.”  Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 
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(ECHR) has recognized the importance of individual human rights 
and their prevalence over group rights or labor rules aimed at im-
proving conditions of workers as a whole. 12 
Similarly, the debate in China over the passage of the new La-
bor Contract Law exhibited a conflict between these three rhetori-
cal positions.13  The government and the official union advanced 
the law as a necessary tool to prevent abuses and to benefit work-
ers as a whole.14  The business groups argued that increasing labor 
 
E.C.R. I-10779, I-10783.  The 2006 Services Directive allowed member states to lim-
it the free movement of service to protect national labor conditions, but further 
cases continue to stand for the proposition that workers rights are not paramount 
over other rights recognized as fundamental by European Union law.  See, e.g., 
Case C-319/06, Comm’n v. Grand Duchy of Lux., 2008 E.C.R. I-4323 (holding that 
Luxembourg’s implementation of the Posted Workers Directive hindered free 
movement of services by imposing compliance with rules agreed to by collective 
agreements recognized as nationally applicable); Case C-341/05, Laval un Partne-
ri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R I-11767 (holding that 
the right of workers to strike did not trump the right of businesses to provide ser-
vices in multiple countries); Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 
E.C.R. I-1989 (holding that the freedom of workers to offer services was abridged 
by a mandated collectively agreed salary).  See also Catherine Barnard, Case and 
Comment, Social Dumping Or Dumping Socialism?, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 262 (2008) 
(summarizing and discussing the aforementioned cases). 
12 See Wilson v. United Kingdom, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 (2002), for a decla-
ration by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) that workers have a 
right to union organization for the purpose of collective bargaining under Article 
11 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  However, the ECHR has also 
recognized a parallel right not to associate, which undermines the existence of any 
“closed shops” in Europe.  For a conclusion by the ECHR that dismissing em-
ployees because they refused to join a trade union violated Article 11 on freedom 
of association, see Young, James and Webster, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24–27 
(1981).  For an analysis of Young, James and Webster, see M. Forde, The “Closed 
Shop” Case, 11 INDUS. L.J. 1 (1982). 
13 For an analysis of China’s recently adopted regulation, see Sean Cooney et 
al., China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity of Labour 
Relations in the PRC, 30 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 786 (2007). 
14 See NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE, LABOR CONTRACT 
LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [Unofficial English Translation], art. 1 (In-
ternational Publications 2007), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu 
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=intl (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (“This 
Law has been formulated to improve and perfect the labor contract system, to … 
protect the lawful rights and interests of laborers and to build and develop har-
monious and stable labor relationships.”); Virginia E. Harper Ho, From Contract to 
Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation under China’s New Labor Legislation, 23 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 68-71 (2009) (listing several improvements to workers’ 
rights brought by the new law, including limits on terminations, broadening the 
role of unions, and mandatory contracts for all workers); see also David Barboza, 
China Drafts Law to Empower Unions and End Labor Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/business/worldbusiness 
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standards would raise their costs, thereby reducing investment in 
the country and potentially forcing firms to move elsewhere.15  
Some observers argued that the new law maintained or even in-
creased the stronghold of the official union.16  It thereby prevents 
workers’ effective freedom of association and curtails the forma-
tion of independent workers’ organizations that are truly repre-
sentative.17 
In current scholarly and policy debates in the United States and 
elsewhere, these discursive positions are often advanced as irre-
ducible and as though they necessarily cancel each other out.  In 
contrast, this Article develops an analytical framework that chal-
lenges the necessity of such conflict and, instead, explores the way 
 
/13sweat.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (“China is planning to adopt a new law that 
seeks to crack down on sweatshops and protect workers' rights by giving labor 
unions real power.”). 
15 See Tim Costello et al., Behind the Great Wall of China: U.S. Corporations Op-
posing New Rights for Chinese Workers, GLOBAL LAB. STRATEGIES, 
http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/files/behind_the_great
_wall_of_china.pdf. 
US-based global corporations like Wal-Mart, Google, UPS, Microsoft, 
Nike, AT&T, and Intel, acting through US business organizations like the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and the US-China Busi-
ness Council, are actively lobbying against the new legislation. They are 
also threatening that foreign corporations will withdraw from China if it 
is passed. 
Id.; Li Jing, China’s New Labor Contract and Protection of Worker, 32 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1083, 1108-10 (2009) (describing negative reaction of employers to the new 
law). 
16 Michael Zhang, Official trade union gets the cold shoulder from private firms, 
CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, Feb. 3, 2006 (describing legal and political hurdles to the 
formation of independent unions, including the official union’s rejection of the 
idea of allowing workers the right to form their own unions).  See also China’s New 
Labour Law, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com 
/node/10268128?story_id=10268128 (“The new law has been a boon to the [offi-
cial union], . . . but . . . few expect it to emerge as a strident new champion of 
workers' rights. Independent trade unions will remain in effect illegal.”). 
17 IHLO, Trade union concerns update: People’s Republic of China, Nov. 2008, 
available at http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/W/001108.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) 
(describing the law as boosting the role of the official trade union, rather than rep-
resentatives and worker congresses, leading to an absence of truly independent 
organizations that in turn handicapped collective bargaining).  See M.O., China’s 
New Contract Labor Law, GLOBAL LAB. STRATEGIES, July 2007, available at 
http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/2007/07/chinas-new-
cont.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (finding the new labor flawed as “[i]t does not 
allow for freedom of association, the right to independent unions, or the right to 
strike—the core labor rights that workers everywhere have fought for over the 
last century”). 
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in which each of these discursive positions can inform the others 
productively.  The framework aims to enable an exploration of 
trade-offs in labor regulation and experiment with potential legal-
institutional arrangements currently beyond our imagination. 
To apply this framework, this Article focuses on the debates 
over labor regulation in Mexico and the United States.  Each coun-
try is at a moment where reform seems both desirable but also 
highly contentious.  The comparison of the collective bargaining 
systems in Mexico and the United States can shed light on how 
these three labor discourses have limited the debates about labor 
regulation in two different countries.  While these systems belong 
to different political traditions of collective bargaining organiza-
tion, these rhetorical positions are alive in both jurisdictions.  Un-
der this framework, however, each position has something to con-
tribute to a broader—and more fertile—debate about the role of 
collective bargaining in a democratic society. 
The Article consists of three parts. Part 1 offers a conceptual 
framework that identifies three discourses in labor law debates, 
which it names the “social,” the “neoliberal,” and the “rights-
based” positions.  This part also explores the transnational charac-
ter of these positions.  Part 2 examines how these positions con-
strain the debate.  It focuses on the tension between labor rules that 
give unions considerable power, like the closed shop agreement, 
and the individual right to freedom of association.  In contrast with 
conventional wisdom, which accepts the incompatibility of these 
positions, this Article shows that some elements of these approach-
es can be combined to enrich the debate and foster institutional 
imagination for reform. 
Part 3 applies the proposed conceptual framework to compare 
the collective bargaining systems of the United States and Mexico.  
It examines how the Mexican labor law regime could embrace the 
democratic aspirations of the rights-based position (dominant in 
the United States) without eliminating labor rules that facilitate col-
lective bargaining.  In contrast, the American labor law regime 
could embrace the aspirations of the social position (dominant in 
Mexico) to ease workers’ organization and facilitate collective bar-
gaining, without undermining the system’s democratic character.  
This analysis draws attention to possibilities that have been forec-
losed in each country and shows how they have been opened up 
elsewhere.  Based on this analysis, the Article suggests reform al-
ternatives other than eliminating the closed shop in Mexico, which 
could satisfy the democratic aspirations of the rights-based posi-
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tion without foregoing mechanisms that ease workers’ ability to 
organize.  Lastly, it considers the concerns of the neoliberal posi-
tion and examines the potential effects of such alternatives on spe-
cific groups of workers as well as on the economy in general.   
2. THREE DISCOURSES OF LABOR LAW 
2.1. Labor Law as a Social Project 
The first discursive position, which I call the “social,” stands 
for the regulation of labor relations as a means to ensure workers’ 
welfare and guarantee security and stability at the workplace.  This 
body of state regulation emerged in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as a reaction to the dramatic effects of indu-
strialization, for which private law was no longer deemed well-
suited.  Social law was carved out as a new space in between the 
private sphere of civil society, consisting of market transactions 
and family relations, and the public sphere of government rule and 
civic affairs.18 
The intellectual origins of social law can be traced back to Eu-
rope, and particularly to France and Germany at the end of the ni-
neteenth century.  A group of jurists criticized the liberal founda-
tions of the legal system, which was deemed outdated and 
detached from economic and social conditions of the time.  These 
jurists attacked the then-predominant legal reasoning for being too 
formalist and uninterested in the way law shaped social relations 
and construed social order.  These scholars also claimed that con-
trary to what liberal jurists held, the legal materials and doctrines 
were not a body of coherent and consistent rules from which a de-
terminate result could be obtained; rather, they were riddled with 
contradictions and incoherencies that made law open-ended.19  La-
bor law stood at the forefront of the “socialization” of law, carving 
out a new field out of private law, which formerly governed em-
ployer-employee relations. 
 
18 I use the term “social,” following Duncan Kennedy in Three Globalizations of 
Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 37–62 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).  
19 François Gény in France and Rudolf von Jhering in Germany both devel-
oped poignant critiques of the highly formalistic nineteenth century jurispru-
dence, which then influenced American legal scholars.  See id. at 46-50; Mathias 
Reimann, Continental Imports - The Influence of European Law and Jurisprudence in the 
United States, 64 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 391, 398-99 (1996).  
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The critiques and ideas advocating the creation of social law 
spread around Europe and eventually all over the world.  Moreo-
ver, social law became influential in the regulation of international 
affairs.  After World War I, the Western powers relied on ideas of 
social law when they proposed the ILO in the Treaty of Versailles, 
which ended the armed conflict in 1919.20 
Governments and elites all around the world came to regard 
social law as the type of law needed in modern society.  Social law 
became equivalent to modern law, and it gradually displaced the 
old classical liberal law, associated with a bygone era.  As govern-
ments embarked on projects of industrialization and greater state 
control of the economy, the new laws were introduced as founda-
tional national projects claiming some kind of original and cultural 
connection with the society in question.21  In Mexico, for instance, 
some aspects of social law, like communal land tenure, were asso-
ciated with the pre-Hispanic legal regimes.  Labor rights were pre-
sented as a uniquely national and innovative project that crystal-
lized in the 1917 Consititution.   
In the United States, critiques of classical liberalism stemming 
from European social thought influenced the development of the 
labor movement in its industrial phase,22 even though the domi-
nant influence continued to be the tradition of civil republicanism 
that informed trade unions in the post-bellum era.23  While the AFL 
 
20 The ILO Constitution was first set out in Part XIII of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, adopted at the Peace Conference in April of 1919.  The Constitution’s 
preamble noted that “conditions of labour exist involving such injustice hardship 
and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the 
peace and harmony of the world are imperiled . . . .”  Constitution of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, pmbl., June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 2713–14, 225 Con-
sol. T.S. 373, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm. 
21 See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 48 (identifying a pattern of legal elites claim-
ing that the social was “uniquely appropriate to the nation in question”). 
22 CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, 
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, 52 (“[W]hile the la-
bor movement’s republicanism continued to develop there came a growing inter-
est in the collectivist theories now radiating from the centers of European social 
democracy.”).  For more literature on the socialist influences of American progres-
sives, see BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT 
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 6-7 (2001) and infra sources 
and text accompanying note 25. 
23 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 17-24, 51, 57 (1991) (arguing that the broad reform politics influenced 
by European social thought were always part of the American labor movement, 
but remained in the minority partly through the aggressive anti-union decisions 
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struggled to convince courts that the individualist version of ‘liber-
ty’ they propounded through anti-union injunctions was a perver-
sion of republicanism,24 legal scholars were attacking classical lib-
eral thought and proposing a new sociological jurisprudence 
attuned to their society’s needs and practices.25  These scholars ar-
gued that legal interpretation had to turn from formal logic and 
speculation to empirical studies and the work of the social 
sciences.26  Following on their heel, the legal Realists, many of 
whom were influenced by institutional economics, whose tradition 
could be traced back to the German historical school of econom-
ics,27 devoted their energies not only in critiquing classical liberal 
law, but in creating a new legal framework for administering labor 
conflicts through the New Deal’s administrative agencies.28  Thus, 
even though the New Deal was the result of particular on-the-
ground facts and intellectual forces in the United States, its predo-
minant ideology of serving the public interest through extensive 
 
of the courts which forced the labor movement to narrowly concentrate on a vo-
luntarist agenda).  
24 TOMLINS, supra note 22, at 62 (“Labor unions, [the AFL leadership] asserted, 
were essential to the survival of a truly republican polity in the United States. It 
was the judiciary which professed to deny this that threatened the survival of the 
republic, not the unions.”). 
25 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 101–
02 (1921) (“We are getting away from . . . the conception of a lawsuit either as a 
mathematical problem or as a sportsman’s game. . . . We are thinking of the end 
which the law serves, and fitting its rules to the task of service.”); Roscoe Pound, 
The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30 HARV. L. REV. 201, 203 (1917) (ar-
guing that the law was reinterpreted as “removing or preventing obstacles to . . . 
individual self-assertion”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes 
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, 
grows to meet the demands of society.”). 
26 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821–34 (1935) (postulating a “functional” approach to in-
terpreting law that would take a multidisciplinary perspective); Karl N. Llewel-
lyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 
1222 (1931) (examining the main tenets of the Legal Realist movement and re-
marking that ideas from other fields of thought, like the social sciences and phys-
ics, had “spilled” into the study of the law). 
27 For a thorough account of the relationship between legal realists and two 
different strands of institutional economics, see Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers?  
Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11 
LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 60 (1993). 
28 The legal realists were influenced by Thornstein Veblen’s version of insti-
tutional economics and were therefore prone to acknowledging a much broader 
role for the state in the regulation of labor conflict.  Id. at 61. 
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government intervention was quite resonant with the internation-
ally prevalent ideology of the social.29 
The confrontation between the classical legal thinkers and the 
younger Legal Realists took place at the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury in the context of industrialization, economic change, and labor 
unrest.  It is no coincidence that many of the paradigmatic cases of 
the time, which animated the Legal Realist agenda, were indeed 
disputes between capital and labor.30  The Realists’ agenda helped 
change the classical conceptions about the role of law in the econ-
omy and enabled a progressive political movement to enact social 
legislation in favor of workers, and to defend this program in the 
courts.  The New Deal and its programs of social regulation, in-
cluding prominent labor laws like the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), indicate an influence of social law ideas in the United 
States.31   
In terms of its political valence, social law was often considered 
a progressive or even radical project.  This was not true every-
where, however, and indeed the social agenda took different orien-
tations depending on each country’s political context.  Labor law 
regulations were introduced by left and right-wing governments, 
and the same under democratic and dictatorial regimes.32 
In Mexico, the social position was the predominant intellectual 
tradition in the twentieth century, which underpinned the renewal 
of the modern nation-state after the Revolution and permeated the 
country’s political, economic and institutional life.  Jurists and poli-
ticians criticized nineteenth century liberalism both because of its 
individualistic assumptions and because of its negative conse-
 
29 See, e.g., NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF 
AMERICAN LABOR 4-13 (2003). 
30 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (striking down a law on bakers’ working hours and beginning an era of at-
tacks by the Supreme Court of the United States on social legislation on the 
grounds that such laws violated substantive due process); Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 
1079–82 (“The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social 
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic 
and general propositions of law which nobody disputes.”).  See generally Ellen M. 
Kelman, American Labor Law and Legal Formalism: How “Legal Logic” Shaped and Vi-
tiated the Rights of American Workers, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1983) (tracing the cen-
trality of legal formalist thinking in shaping American labor law). 
31 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 18, at 42-54 (describing the influence of the 
social in legislation and the creation of welfare state institutions around the world, 
including the United States).  
32 See id. at 47–50 (listing the various manifestations of the “social” globally). 
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quences, which they saw in the unjust distribution of wealth and 
power in society.33 
The traditional narrative in Mexico’s labor law scholarship 
claims that the country’s labor law is a national invention that re-
sponded to a radically progressive political project.  This view 
holds that social law stemmed from the 1910 Mexican Revolution 
and was crystallized in the 1917 Constitution, the first social consti-
tution of the world and the first ever to include workers’ rights in 
its text.34 
Doctrinally, social jurists pushed for recognition that free will 
could not be the sole source of a legally binding obligation.  In a 
contract between employers and workers, free will could not cap-
ture the considerably different bargaining power of both parties to 
the agreement, which often resulted in a coerced deal.  They pro-
posed a list of non-negotiable baseline rules and compulsory claus-
es to level workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis employers and 
guarantee a set of minimum benefits and working conditions.  
They also sought to expand employers’ liability for accidents in the 
workplace, abandoning negligence and moving towards strict lia-
bility.35  
Social law underpins a great number of national institutions 
that form the Mexican welfare state, comprising workers’ compen-
sation, health insurance, retirement, and public housing.  These in-
stitutions were at the core of social security.36  They provided a 
 
33 See PASTOR ROUAIX, GENESIS DE LOS ARTICULOS 27 Y 123 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE 1917 (1959). 
34 Noted labor law scholars have strongly sustained this position.  See, e.g., 
ALFONSO NORIEGA CANTÚ, LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES, CREACIÓN DE LA REVOLUCIÓN 
DE 1910 Y DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1917 [SOCIAL RIGHTS, A CREATION OF THE 1910 
REVOLUTION AND THE 1917 CONSTITUTION] (1988); ALBERTO TRUEBA-URBINA, 
DERECHO SOCIAL MEXICANO (1978) [MEXICAN SOCIAL LAW]; LA PRIMERA 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICO-SOCIAL DEL MUNDO (1971) [THE FIRST POLITICAL-SOCIAL 
CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD].  This view is shared by the labor law canonical 
text: MARIO DE LA CUEVA, EL NUEVO DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO [THE NEW 
MEXICAN LABOR LAW] (13 ed. 1993). 
35 Socialization ran through all areas of private law as was clearly expressed 
in the new Civil Code of 1928.  The Commission that wrote the Civil Code ex-
plained: “The law must be socialized. . . . The central philosophy that is present 
throughout the Draft may be briefly expressed in these words: to harmonize the 
individual interests with the social ones, correcting the excessive individualism 
which prevailed in the Civil Code of 1884.”  EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS DE LA 
COMISIÓN REDACTORA DEL CÓDIGO CIVIL DE 1928, CÓDIGO CIVIL PARA EL DISTRITO 
FEDERAL 7–37 (Editorial Porrúa, 69th ed., 2001). 
36 See 2 MARIO DE LA CUEVA, NUEVO DERECHO MEXICANO DEL TRABAJO 68-74 
(Mexico 1979). 
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safety net for workers and were largely responsible for the emer-
gence and expansion of a new middle class. 
In the debate about the reform of labor law, the main goal of 
the positions associated with the defense of the current law is to 
preserve the stability and security of employment.  The rules that 
make this regime possible are related to grounds for dismissal 
(termination of employment contract) and duration of the contract.  
This position favors protections against unjust dismissal, right to 
reinstatement or compensation upon dismissal, and employment 
for an indefinite term.  In terms of working conditions, the rules 
support wages and promotion based on seniority, limited working 
hours per day, and double payment for extra-hours.  Benefits in-
clude maternity leave, paid vacation and annual bonuses, among 
others.37  
There are several actors supporting the status quo or the rein-
vigoration of these laws as a defense of social institutions.  Al-
though there positions vary, the list includes political parties like 
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (“PRI”) and Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (“PRD”); which are associated with a na-
tionalist left-of-center political project; the traditional labor move-
ment, represented by the Confederación de Trabajadores de Méxi-
co (“CTM”); independent unions; a fraction of employers; and a 
sector of the Catholic Church. 
The “social” critique of the liberal state is not an exclusively po-
litically progressive project.  There is a longstanding intellectual 
tradition in the Catholic “social doctrine,” which emphasizes inter-
dependence and reconciliation—rather than struggle—between so-
cial classes, with important influence in Mexico.38  A few notable 
corporate firms hold these beliefs dear and have long emphasized 
corporate social responsibility, advocating the familial nature of 
the firm.  Some of these firms began to provide corporate welfare 
such as health insurance, retirement, and housing, even before the 
national social security system was put in place.39 
 
37 See COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, COMPARATIVE GUIDES TO LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN NORTH AMERICA (2002) (analyzing the structure of cur-
rent Mexican labor law and comparing it with the laws of the United States and 
Canada). 
38 See, e.g., GASTON GARCIA CANTU, EL SOCIALISMO EN MEXICO.  SIGLO XIX 172–
79 (1969); VICENTE FUENTES DIAZ, LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA EN MÉXICO, ¿UN 
INTENTO FALLIDO? (1972). 
39 See JOHN WALTON, ELITES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICAN CITIES 168–72 (1977) (ex-
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Claims defending the current labor system present it as inhe-
rently good, desirable, or justifiable largely because it is thought of 
as a national invention and as the result of the winner-take-all vic-
tory of a radical progressive political project.40  Contrary to main-
stream labor law mythology, however, a careful study of the rele-
vant historical developments reveals both the foreign intellectual 
influence and the rather centrist compromise between the groups 
that created the labor law.41  Labor scholars have played a funda-
mental role in the construction of a traditional narrative that fanta-
sizes about the original labor law as a radical body of rules.  Thus, 
they reinforce the view that all would be well for workers if only 
we could make that law a reality, acting as if the substantive issues 
of the debate have already been resolved.  
2.2. Neo-Liberalism or “Neo-Laborism” as a Development Project 
The neoliberal discursive position emerged as a reaction to the 
social position.  The neoliberal discourse advocates a very limited 
role for the state in the economy, and the labor market is no excep-
tion.  According to the neoliberal position, most labor laws create 
distortions in the market that result in inefficient outcomes.  How-
ever lofty its objectives may be, protective labor legislation hinders 
economic activity and ends up hurting workers and society as a 
whole. 
Neoliberals have advocated a strong labor reform agenda 
aimed at curtailing “legal rigidities” to ensure employment flexibil-
ity and reduce costs on employers.  The prevailing assumption is 
that decreasing costs on hiring and firing workers would increase 
firms’ competitiveness and would generate more jobs to the benefit 
 
amining the role of the industrialist firms in Monterrey, Mexico).  See generally 
MICHAEL SNODGRASS, DEFERENCE AND DEFIANCE IN MONTERREY: WORKERS, 
PATERNALISM, AND REVOLUTION IN MEXICO, 1890–1950 (2003) (analyzing Monter-
rey’s system of industrial paternalism). 
40 See CANTÚ, supra note 38, at 83 (1988). 
41 See generally PASTOR ROUAIX, supra note 33; Duncan Kennedy & Marie-
Claire Belleau, François Gény aux États-Unis, in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MYTHE ET REALITÉS: 
1899–1999 CENTENAIRE DE MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ 
POSITIF, ESSAI CRITIQUE 295 (2000) (analyzing the nature of the “centrist compro-
mise” in projects of reconstruction of the legal system around the idea of the “so-
cial”); KEVIN J. MIDDLEBROOK, THE PARADOX OF REVOLUTION: LABOR, THE STATE, AND 
AUTHORITARIANISM IN MEXICO (1995) (analyzing the labor law movement’s forma-
tion in Mexico). 
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of the most vulnerable groups in society.42  The proposed rules 
seek to establish at-will employment contracts, no right for re-
instatement or compensation upon dismissal, temporary employ-
ment contracts, and trial periods.  As for working conditions, pro-
posed rules seek individualization of wages, promotion based on 
merit rather than seniority and flexibility in working hours. 
The neoliberal position is associated with the intellectual tradi-
tion of the Chicago School of Economics in the United States.  This 
approach had a profound influence on legal thought and legal 
scholarship.  A number of legal scholars working in this tradition 
attacked the New Deal legislation, prominently its labor and em-
ployment laws, for their allegedly inefficient and wasteful out-
comes.43 
Neoliberal thought replaced the post-World War II Keynesian 
consensus in the United States and at the same time had a pro-
found influence abroad.44  International institutions, emboldened 
by several crises in the developing world and the collapse of com-
munism, advanced the neoliberal model as the recipe for develop-
ment.  As part of the model, international institutions recommend-
ed deregulation of labor laws to make them more flexible.45 
 
42 This position was articulated by international development institutions like 
the World Bank.  See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: 
WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 109-11 (1995) (arguing that “[i]ncreasing labor 
market flexibility” is an effective response to aid workers displaced by massive 
employment restructuring by “[f]acilitating labor mobility,” “[m]aking relative 
wages more flexible,” and “[b]reaking the link between social services and em-
ployment”).  See also THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2004: UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: 30–33 (2004) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2004] (arguing that em-
ployment regulations that facilitate flexible hiring and firing have better economic 
effects).  
43 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of 
the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) (arguing that New 
Deal legislation should be “scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible com-
mon law regime relying upon tort and contract law”); Richard A. Posner, Some 
Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 990 (1984) (arguing that labor law 
can be best understood as a device for facilitating the cartelization of the labor 
supply by unions). 
44 See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES (2002) (examining how “northern exports” like neoliberal eco-
nomic theory and international human rights law have been received in Latin 
America). 
45 See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN 
AN INTEGRATING WORLD, supra note 42, at 109–11 (arguing the benefits of deregula-
tion through regional examples); THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2006: 
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The neoliberal position in Mexico has been largely heralded as 
a critique of the labor regulation and labor institutions put in place 
by the nationalist regime that followed the Mexican Revolution.  Its 
advocates argue that the country’s process of economic integration 
with North America and its insertion in the global economy re-
quire specific changes in its labor law.  According to this view, cur-
rent labor law is excessively protectionist and out of touch with 
modern forms of production.  It curtails productivity, competitive-
ness and ultimately prevents economic growth.  Labor relations 
should be governed by the will of the parties in the employment 
relationship, unencumbered by state regulation requiring specific 
terms in the employment contract.  If job stability is in the interest 
of the employee, he or she will negotiate it in the employment con-
tract.46  Advocates of this position deem social regulation to be 
passé and outdated.  They argue that labor regulation needs to be 
reformed if the country ever aspires to become “modern” and 
wishes to participate competitively in the global economy.  This 
critique portrays current regulation as pre-modern and the pro-
posed reforms as the path to a modern economy.47 
Supporters of this position include political parties like the Par-
tido Acción Nacional (“PAN”) and an important fraction of the PRI 
(which has advocated market-oriented reforms).  Among the 
staunchest supporters are employers, who advocate reform as the 
key to higher productivity and international competitiveness.  De-
spite powerful critiques of the “Washington consensus” model of 
economic development48 and of the impact of labor flexibility on 
 
CREATING JOBS 26 (2006) (advocating the adoption of flexible employment regula-
tion reforms in order to enhance business activity).  
46 See generally GUSTAVO R. VELASCO, LABOR LEGISLATION FROM AN ECONOMIC 
POINT OF VIEW (B.A. Rogge ed., 1973) (forcefully articulating these arguments in 
the case of Mexican labor regulation) 
47 Advocates of this position, however, forget that labor law and social legis-
lation more broadly represented the modern position.  Labor regulation was in-
troduced as a reaction to the old liberal regime of the nineteenth century and it 
was indeed successful at modernizing the economy.  Thus, the neoliberal position 
is subject to a symmetrical challenge that its proposals date back from the nine-
teenth century and are old-fashioned, far from representing the path to moderni-
ty. 
48 See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? (Inst. for Int’l 
Econ. 1997) (arguing that in its current form globalization may lead to domestic 
social disintegration and does not guarantee positive economic results); JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (W.W. Norton & Co. 2003) (analyz-
ing the negative social and economic effects of the set of reforms associated with 
the neoliberal economic model). 
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job creation and economic growth,49 proponents of the neoliberal 
position treat their arguments as uncontroversial.50   
2.3. Individual Rights as a Proxy for Democracy 
This discursive position emphasizes individual rights as the 
paragon of individual autonomy.  In the context of collective bar-
gaining, this position advances the enjoyment of individual rights 
as a proxy for democracy.  This position has shed light on the pe-
rils that collective action poses for individual freedom.  It has 
called attention to the ways workers’ organizations—and state 
regulation enabling them—can disregard effective representation 
and hinder individual liberty in the name of welfare gains.  For 
advocates of this position, negative freedom, the right that neither 
the state nor a third party interferes with one’s entitlements and 
choices is a paramount consideration and cannot be compromised.  
Indeed, a pervasive interpretation of the individual right to free-
dom of association as negative has severely undermined workers’ 
ability—their right—to bargain collectively. 
This position is often associated with a libertarian philosophical 
tradition, which has had influential followers in legal scholarship 
 
49 See Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The De-
bate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance, 19 INT’L ECON. J. 129, 129–30 
(2005) (arguing that the debate over whether labor institutions impair aggregate 
performance is inconclusive); Richard B. Freeman, War of the models: Which labor 
market institutions for the 21st century?, 5 LABOUR ECONOMICS 1, 1-24 (1998) (analyz-
ing various models of labor market regulation and their different benefits).  For an 
empirical analysis across countries, see DEAN BAKER ET AL., Labor Market Institu-
tions and Unemployment: Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence, in FIGHTING 
UNEMPLOYMENT: THE LIMITS OF FREE MARKET ORTHODOXY 72, 72 (David R. Howell 
ed., 2005) (discussing findings in several time series models, which conclude that 
institutions which adversely affect aggregate outcomes are not robust.  Models 
that cover more years, countries, and measures than earlier studies “provide little 
support for those who advocate comprehensive deregulation of . . . labor mar-
kets.”  See also DAVID DE FERRANTI ET AL., INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: BREAKING 
WITH HISTORY? 271-75 (World Bank 2004) (analyzing theoretical debates and em-
pirical disagreements concerning public employment schemes and select social 
assistance programs); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EMPLOYMENT 
OUTLOOK 1999 (1999). 
50 See WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2010: REFORMING THROUGH DIFFICULT 
TIMES 22-23 (2009) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2010] (insisting on the need to 
make labor regulation more flexibile to achieve better economic performance).  
For a critique of the Doing Business methodology and reform recommendations, 
see Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform and Economic Development, 50 VA. 
J. INT'L L. 43 (2009). 
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and economics.51  Indeed, neoliberal advocates often embraced this 
libertarian position since they regarded almost all types of gov-
ernment intervention not only as highly inefficient, but also an af-
front to individual liberty.  However, it is important to distinguish 
between the normative aspirations of the neoliberal position, effi-
ciency or wealth maximization, and the libertarian ones, individual 
liberty, because they do not necessarily go in tandem.  Although 
they are often intertwined, the relevance of each of these positions 
varies according to context. 
In the United States, the rights-based position is strong and has 
exerted considerable influence in shaping the current collective 
bargaining system.  Indeed, in the name of individual freedom, la-
bor law protections of collective interests and group rights have 
been diminished since the passage of the NLRA both through 
courts and through legislation.52  
A case in point is union-security agreements, such as the closed 
shop, the union shop and the agency shop, which unions negotiate 
with employers to require union membership or financial contribu-
tions from employees as a condition of employment.53  All forms of 
 
51 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (advocating the repeal of anti-
discrimination laws in the workplace because the laws create tension between 
groups, lead to inefficient employment practices, result in more invidious discrim-
ination that they prevent, and impose limits on individual freedom of choice); Ri-
chard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, in LABOR LAW AND THE 
EMPLOYMENT MARKET:  FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 3, 6-7 (Richard Epstein & 
Jeffrey Paul eds., 1985) (arguing against the widely-held view that the contract at 
will has outlived its usefulness and stating that such notions restrict individual 
autonomy); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (50th Anniv. ed. 1994) (cri-
ticizing government intervention from a libertarian perspective). 
52 See, e.g., Reuel Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War 
Labor Law, Liberalism and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
1, 67 (1999) (analyzing a shift in judicial attitude in the balance between individual 
rights and the rights of unions.  While initially sympathetic to the rights of unions, 
after World War II courts increasingly protected the rights of individual workers 
at the expense of organized labor).  Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act:  
What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 138 (2003) (stating that the 
courts have narrowed the initially broader meanings of the Act, thus leaving 
workers less protected); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and 
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 292 
(1978) (“In a number of cases, the Court overruled the decisions of the [National 
Labor Relations] Board . . . and thereby pushed the law in a markedly different 
political direction.”). 
53 The closed shop is an agreement between an employer and a union that 
requires union membership as a condition of employment.  Under the closed 
shop, employers hire only union members and terminate employees that leave the 
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union-security agreements have been eroded by legislative and 
judicial action.54  Initially recognized by the NLRA55, the closed 
shop was later prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act.56  The Supreme 
Court subsequently weakened union-security agreements by strip-
ping down membership in union shops to its “financial core,” ef-
fectively reducing the membership obligation to the payment of 
union dues.57  The Supreme Court further limited the financial core 
obligation to collective bargaining activities prohibiting unions to 
spend fees of objecting nonunion employees on other union activi-
ties that may advance the economic interests of workers, such as 
 
union or are expelled from it.  The union shop requires an employee to become a 
union member after a certain period upon being hired as a condition of continued 
employment.  The agency shop requires an employee to contribute fee payments 
as a condition of employment.  For a description of these types of union-security 
agreements and their implications, see THOMAS HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, 
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS 
(1977). 
54 There is a line of judicial decisions addressing the union and agency shop 
agreements where the Supreme Court narrowly construed legislation involving 
collective rights and focused on the protection of individual rights.  See Ry. Emp. 
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (recognizing the validity of the “union shop” but 
finding that the compulsory union membership extended only to financial sup-
port of the union in its collective bargaining activities); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. 
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (construing the Railway Labor Act to deny unions the 
authority to expend union dues of dissenting employees in support of political 
causes to which those employees objected); NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 
(1963) (construing compulsory union “membership” to include only payment of 
agency fees by non-members, where this is not prohibited by state right-to-work 
laws); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (ruling, in the public sec-
tor context, that union expenditures outside of fees for collective bargaining, over 
the protests of involuntary dues payers, interfered with their First Amendment 
rights and was unconstitutional); Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 
(1988) (construing the NLRA to deny unions the authority to expend union dues 
of dissenting employees beyond those “necessarily or reasonably incurred for the 
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive [bargaining] representative”); 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (limiting further the permissi-
ble uses of union expenditures of dissenting fee-payers in the public sector).  The 
Lehnert Court explained that  “Chargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to col-
lective bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest 
in labor peace and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the bur-
dening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union 
shop.”  Id. at 519. 
55 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).  
56 The Taft-Hartley Act amended and narrowed §8(a)(3) of the NLRA to al-
low unions and employers to require “as a condition of employment [union] 
membership on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such em-
ployment…”  Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141. 
57 NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963). 
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lobbying for labor legislation.58  Enabled by the Taft-Hartley Act, 
several states have altogether banned any type of union-security 
agreements through legislation commonly referred to as ”right-to-
work laws.”59 
The story of the judiciary’s transformation of union-security 
agreements is familiar in other areas of labor law, where courts 
have woven a labor law regime that many scholars now deem hos-
tile to unions and the labor movement.60  Indeed, some scholars 
attribute the dramatic decline in unionization rates, from 40% after 
World War II to about 10% today, to management opposition 
enabled by the legal regime.61 Similarly, scholars attribute a “repre-
sentation gap” between the number of workers who are currently 
union members and those who would like to be part of a union to 
an unfavorable legal system.62 
 This rights-based position is highly visible today in the debate 
generated by the proposed EFCA.  Employers vehemently oppose 
it on the grounds that recognizing a system of card-check to ascer-
tain whether a majority of employees in a firm want to unionize 
will undermine individual workers’ right to choose freely, guaran-
teed by the current obligation to hold an election.  Employers have 
therefore accused unions of attempting to impinge upon individu-
al freedom and have touted the bill as anti-democratic.  Opponents 
know that this bill will facilitate workers’ organization and their 
ability to form unions.  They seem to resist the bill not only because 
 
58 Commc’n Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).  This restriction 
has imposed very onerous bookkeeping requirements on unions to make sure that 
money from objectors is not used to pay for expenses deemed impermissible.  
59 Currently, twenty-two states have passed right-to-work laws.  Right to 
Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND. http://www.nrtw.org/rtws 
.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
60 See, e.g., James G. Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and 
Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004-2005) 
61 Richard B. Freeman, What do Unions Do? The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister 
Edition, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?:  A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 607, 627-629 (James 
T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007); RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, 
WHAT WORKERS WANT 66-67 (Cornell Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter WHAT 
WORKERS WANT](“In the aftermath of World War II . . . Some 40 percent of pri-
vate-sector workers were organized into unions. . . .  Unions [today] represent less 
than 10 percent of private-sector workforce . . .”). 
62 See Richard B. Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More Than Ever 
(Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 182, Feb. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp182.pdf.  See also Cynthia Estlund, 
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2002). 
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of the economic losses it may represent, but also because of the 
bill’s alleged affront to individual freedom. 
Internationally, the individualistic, rights-based position has 
gained considerable prominence.  This position has gained sway in 
a variety of international courts in the world, including the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”).  In a string of relatively 
recent cases, the ECHR has stripped down union security rules that 
gave workers power to organize and bargain collectively.  In the 
name of the negative right of freedom of association, the ECHR has 
practically dismantled the UK’s closed shop rule.63  
The turn to individual rights, however, has not been limited to 
the libertarian position.  Seeking to regain visibility in the interna-
tional debate about labor standards in the face of a strong neoliber-
al, deregulatory agenda, the International Labour Organization 
(“ILO”) articulated a powerful rights-based agenda.  This program, 
included in the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Prin-
ciples at Work, put forth a list of four core labor rights.64  The ILO 
proposed these rights as universal; a minimum baseline to be ob-
served everywhere in the world. A number of scholars have de-
scribed this core agenda as too narrow, effectively giving up on a 
more robust promotion of workers’ rights and labor standards 
around the world.65   Nevertheless, speaking of labor rights as hu-
 
63 See Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Eur. Ct. H. R. 1, 27 (2006) (hold-
ing for the applicants, who complained that the existence of closed shops ran con-
trary to Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights); see also Virginia 
Mantouvalou, Is There a Human Right Not to Be a Trade Union Member?  Labour 
Rights Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AT WORK:  
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND REGULATION 439 (T. Novitz & C. Fenwick eds., 2010).  
64 See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, supra note 8 
(stating that these rights include freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
prohibition of forced labor, prohibition of discrimination, and prohibition of child 
labor.  The right to freedom of association, as articulated by the ILO, is totally 
compatible with laws that give prominence to the negative right to freedom of as-
sociation even when they undermine workers’ ability to organize). 
65  For a critique of the core labor rights strategy, see Philip Alston, ‘Core La-
bour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 457 (2004).  For a reply, see  Brian Langille, Core Labour Rights – 
The True Story (Reply to Alston) 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 409, 427-37 (2005).  See also Mi-
chael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank, Trading Up: An Embryonic Model for Easing the 
Human Costs of Free Market, BOSTON REV., Sept.–Oct. 2006, available at 
http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5 /pioreschrank.php (critiquing the ILO’s mini-
malist “core” labor standards agenda and calling on the Organization to take a 
more active role in developing regulatory practices that can mediate between the 
market and social needs). 
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man rights has been an effective way of talking about protections 
for workers in scholarly, activist, and policy-making circles. 
The view that labor rights are human rights has been proposed 
by a variety of NGOs and civil society groups, such as student 
movements and consumer campaigns.66  This view has enthusiasti-
cally been embraced and advanced by labor movements around 
the world. Furthermore, in an unusual alliance with civil society 
groups, international financial and development institutions have 
also embraced it, showing that they see these minima of rights as 
compatible with a flexible labor market.67 
In the case of Mexico, which has only recently begun a demo-
cratic transition, the appeal to individual rights has become com-
mon currency.  The rights-based position constrains the debate by 
assuming that democracy and the democratic transition require a 
self-evident set of changes.  The gradual transition to a fully demo-
cratic political system since 2000 has been accompanied by an em-
phasis on the importance of rights.  Democracy in the labor system 
has come close to being equated with the right to freedom of asso-
ciation, which has been the basis for complaints before internation-
al and national fora. 
In the debate concerning labor law reform, individual rights 
have become a proxy for democracy and have thus been portrayed 
as incompatible with institutions of the bequeathed corporatist la-
bor system.  The context of the Mexican political transition to de-
mocracy has made it very difficult to articulate criticisms of rights 
or of their dominant interpretations that are considered inherent to 
democracy.  Despite the historical contingency of these rights, cri-
tiques to their current formulation are interpreted as an attack on 
 
66 See Leary, supra note 7, at 22 (arguing that workers’ rights are human rights 
despite the lack of attention given to the rights of workers by the international 
human rights movement). 
67 See, e.g., Rittich, supra note 9, at 157 (“This paper . . . juxtaposes those ef-
forts [to enhance labor protection in the global economy though the recognition of 
core labor rights] with the simultaneous effort of the international financial and 
economic organizations to promote market flexibility.”); DOING BUSINESS 2010, su-
pra note 50, at 22. 
The ILO core labor standards—covering the right to collective bargain-
ing, the elimination of forced labor, the abolition of child labor and 
equitable treatment in employment practices—are fundamental prin-
ciples.  The Doing Business employing workers indicators are fully con-
sistent with the core labor standards but do not measure compliance 
with them. 
Id. 
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democracy itself.  This attitude hinders further investigation of 
their effects on workers.  In the most notorious national case dec-
laring closed shop agreements unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court of Mexico held that the right to belong to an association “is 
exercised by each worker individually.”68  The potential impact of 
this decision may be enormous as it provides an incentive for em-
ployer anti-union practices.  However, under the light of democrat-
ic transition, the overwhelming interpretation of labor scholars is 
that this reform will free the worker from union oppression and 
terminate the alliance of union leaders with the government in re-
turn for political positions.69 
In light of the reform alternatives, the closed shop is associated 
with its current institutional form and despised as anti-democratic.  
This effect precludes the institutional experimentation with the 
closed shop set against a different group of legal arrangements.  
However, in a world unrestrained by these discursive positions, 
we could imagine a collective bargaining regime that disentangles 
the union system from government control, and radically democra-
tizes its internal organization while maintaining automatic unioni-
zation.70  The result could be a comprehensive union scheme that 
could greatly increase the bargaining power of workers. 
2.3.1. The Mobilization of Democracy by Labor Actors 
The discussion about the democratic character of current labor 
law in Mexico is carried out between those who want to democrat-
ize the collective bargaining system in the country and those who 
prefer the status quo.71  Currently, those actors who want to change 
 
68 See Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, Tomo XII, 
Mayo de 2001, Tesis 2ª. LVII/2001, at 321; see also Victor Fuentes, The Court puts an 
end to compulsory unionization, REFORMA, Apr. 18, 2001. 
69 See, e.g., PATRICIA KURCZYN AND MARÍA CARMEN MACÍAS VÁZQUEZ, LIBERTAD 
SINDICAL:  CLÁUSULA DE EXCLUSIÓN (2002). 
70 See generally Tamara Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Law Re-
gimes:  The Contractualist and Corporatist Models Compared, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001 
(1986) (proposing a hybrid between the Brazilian and the American labor models: 
the combination of the American, contractualist type of union organization, inde-
pendent from government, with the Brazilian, corporatist type of automatic unio-
nization). 
71 See Graciela Bensusán, Alternancia política y continuidad laboral: las limita-
ciones de la propuesta del CCE/CT, in REFORMA LABORAL:  ANÁLISIS CRÍTICO DEL 
PROYECTO ABASCAL A LA LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO (2003) (analyzing the various 
labor law reform proposals and comparing the position of the most important un-
ions, employer associations, and political parties over time); see also Graciela Ben-
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the collective bargaining system include independent unions—
which have split from the main corporatist union federations, non-
governmental organizations (”NGOs”), and the PRD.72  Partici-
pants in the camp who prefer the status quo in this respect include 
the traditional corporatist unions such as the Confederación de 
Trabajadores de México (“CTM”) and, Confederación Revolucio-
naria de Obreros y Campesinos (“CROC”), several employer asso-
ciations such as the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (“CCE”), 
Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana 
(“COPARMEX”), and Confederación de Cámaras Industriales 
(“CONCAMIN”), as well as political parties such as Partido de la 
Revolución Institucional and Partido Acción Nacional.73 
Those who want to effect change, but find the national labor in-
stitutions inaccessible or biased against them have tried to mobilize 
international support for their cause.  NAFTA’s Labor Side 
Agreement is perhaps the best example of an international forum 
that has helped independent unions and labor-related NGOs to 
gain visibility and voice their grievances.  Though it has been justly 
criticized for having highly ineffective enforcement mechanisms,74 
 
susán, La reforma de la legislación laboral (1988-2001), Nov. 21, 2001, 
http://www.unt.org.mx/lft/reformalab.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2010) (propo-
sing labor law reform); Enrique de la Garza Toledo, La disputa por la Nueva Ley 
Federal del Trabajo, in MÉXICO: HACIA UNA REFORMA INTEGRAL DEL ESTADO. 
PROPUESTAS Y ALTERNATIVAS 367 (Jorge A. Calderón and Alejandra Tello eds., 2005) 
(comparing the main labor law features between Mexico, the United States and 
Canada and discussing the ongoing labor law debate in Mexico); Enrique de la 
Garza Toledo, Reflexiones acerca de la Reforma Laboral, in ECONOMÍA, TEORÍA Y 
PRÁCTICA 92 (UAM 2004) (tracing the main agendas of employers, unions and the 
government in the long debate about labor law reform). 
72 See generally Unión Nacional De Trabajadores & Partido de la Revolución 
Democrática, Propuesta de la Unión Nacional de Trabajadores: Anteproyecto Reforma 
Ley Federal Del Trabajo, June 2002, http://www.unt.org.mx/lft/propreflft.htm 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2010) (presenting the Labor Law Reform proposal by the Un-
ión Nacional de Trabajadores (“UNT”) and Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
(“PRD”) in October 2002, with the support of several representatives from PRI, 
PAN, and PT). 
73 In 1995, the PAN presented to Congress an initiative for labor reform, pre-
pared by Néstor de Buen and Carlos E. de Buen Unna, which sought to democrat-
ize the collective bargaining system.  The proposal later lost the party’s support 
and since the PAN won the presidency in 2000, it has allied with the traditional 
corporatist unions, proposing a labor law reform that favors their interests.  See 
generally Appendix in LA REFORMA LABORAL QUE NECESITAMOS: ¿CÓMO TRANSITAR A 
UNA AUTÉNTICA MODERNIZACIÓN LABORAL? (José Alfonso Bouzas Ortiz, coord., 
2004). 
74 See Rainer Dombois et al., Transnational Labor Regulation in the NAFTA - A 
problem of Institutional Design? The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor 
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it has nevertheless served to mobilize transnational alliances and 
solidarity between unions and NGOs in Mexico and the United 
States.  At its best, this forum has functioned as a mechanism for 
shaming Mexican labor institutions’ ineffectiveness or blatant 
denial of justice as well as the traditional unions’ abusive, gen-
dered and illegal labor practices.75   
The substantive framework of the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”)76 is premised, generally, on 
rights77 and, specifically, on individual rights.78  Workers’ organi-
 
Cooperation Between the USA, Mexico and Canada, 19 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. 
RELATIONS REL. 421, 434-35 (2003) (“[C]omplainants and their transnational net-
works frequently get caught in a trap of disillusionment . . . it should be clear that 
the institutional design puts specific limitations to the regulatory power and ef-
fects of the NAALC.”); CANADA/MEXICO/UNITED STATES PUBLICATIONS, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, TRADING AWAY RIGHTS: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF NAFTA’S 
LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT, April 2001, Vol. 13, No. 2(B), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/04/01/canadamexicounited-states-
trading-away-rights-unfulfilled-promise (analyzing the structural weaknesses of 
the NAALC system, the timid use by the parties, the failure to institute sanctions 
against alleged labor rights violators in any of the twenty three complaints, and 
proposing reforms). 
75 See Lance Compa, NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement and International Labor So-
lidarity, 33 ANTIPODE 451, 453–54 (2001): 
The NAALC is not a full-fledged international enforcement mechanism. 
Instead, [it] is intended as a review mechanism by which member coun-
tries open themselves up to investigation, reports, evaluations, recom-
mendations, and other measures so that, over time, such enhanced over-
sight and scrutiny will generate more effective labor law enforcement. 
Id.; Lance Compa, NAFTA’s Labour Side Agreement Five Years On: Progress and Pros-
pects for the NAALC, 7 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L. J. 1, 8-17 (1999) (detailing cases involv-
ing alleged workers’ rights violations in Mexico); MARIA LORENA COOK, THE 
POLITICS OF LABOR REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA:  BETWEEN FLEXIBILITY AND RIGHTS 189-
90 (2007) (discussing NAFTA’s agreement on labor issues, the NAALC, that 
“enabled citizens of Mexico, Canada, and the United States to file complaints re-
lating to governments’ ineffective enforcement of labor legislation . . . in many in-
stances the use of the NAALC drew attention to persistent labor rights violations, 
and in some cases the publicity itself helped to end abusive practices.”). 
76 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 
1499 (1993), available at http://www.naalc.org/naalc/naalc-full-text.htm.   
77 This shift from a regulatory to a rights-based approach has permeated 
practically all areas of labor law.  See, e.g., Michael Lynk, Disability and Work: The 
Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with Disabilities in the Canadian 
Workplace, in THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, SPECIAL LECTURES 2007: 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (R. Echlin & C. Paliare eds., 2007) (noting how the conceptuali-
zation of disability and its remedies has shifted from welfare entitlements to indi-
vidual rights). 
78 For a review of the NAALC, see Stephen F. Diamond, Labor Rights in the 
Global Economy: A Case Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in HUMAN 
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zations have complained of the many hurdles they face when try-
ing to unionize or bargain collectively.  The obstacles range from 
government institutional delays, aggressive resistance by tradi-
tional unions and employer anti-union practices.  These grievances 
are often expressed as violations of the right to freedom of associa-
tion.79   
The independent unions’ agenda consists of demands directed 
against traditional unions, employers, and the government.  To a 
great extent, independent unions and workers’ organizations have 
come to see their democratic agenda as encompassed by the right 
to freedom of association.  In their view, if the right to freedom of 
association were guaranteed, the conditions they seek would be 
greatly advanced.  Their resort to the NAFTA mechanisms can be 
explained, at least partly, by the gridlock of national institutions—
dominated by the unholy alliances between traditional labor, em-
ployers, and the government—which preserves the status quo.  
This gridlock explains the efforts of independent unions and sym-
pathetic NGOs to frame their agenda around rights comprised in 
ILO conventions, and to demand their compliance as a matter of 
international law by which Mexico is bound.80   
In a relatively recent example, an alliance of independent Mex-
ican unions and sympathetic unions and NGOs from the United 
States and Canada brought a claim before the NAALC’s office in 
the United States.  They argued that the labor law reform proposed 
by then President Fox breached several of Mexico’s international 
 
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 199 (Lance Compa & Stephen 
Diamond, eds. 1996). 
79 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 74, at 38: 
By far, more NAALC cases have included allegations of violations of the 
right to freedom of association and the right to organize than any other 
labor principle recognized by the accord: fifteen out of twenty-three.  In 
the NAALC context, ten cases have been aired in which Mexico has been 
accused of failing to effectively enforce its laws protecting freedom of as-
sociation and the right to organize. 
Id. 
80 A Supreme Court decision put an end to a long controversy about the hie-
rarchical status of international treaties in domestic law.  The court decided that 
international treaties—signed by the President and ratified by the Senate accord-
ing to Article 133 of the Constitution—have primacy over federal legislation but 
are hierarchically inferior to the Constitution.  See Semanario Judicial de la Fede-
ración y su Gaceta, Novena Época, Tomo: X, Noviembre de 1999, Tesis P. 
LXXVII/99, at 46. 
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obligations, most notably the right to freedom of association.81  
Even though the independent unions initially participated in the 
discussions and negotiations of the proposed reform, they with-
drew early, alleging that their interests were not represented.  The 
U.S. government dismissed the petition and eventually the labor 
reform initiative failed in the Mexican Congress.  The independent 
unions’ sense of desperation brought about by the closure of na-
tional institutions and their marginalization is quite clear in the pe-
tition.  Equally clear is their strategic use of international mechan-
isms, however ineffective they ultimately proved to be, to make 
their case domestically.   
My point is that as helpful as a rights-based strategy has been 
in advancing the democratic agenda, it remains limited.  It is per-
haps a necessary component under current conditions, but it 
should not come to define the goals of or constitute the main aspi-
rations of the agenda.  This is especially so because the restrictive 
way in which freedom of association has been interpreted (free-
dom to associate equals freedom not to associate) threatens to de-
legitimize not just the corrupt cooptation of union leadership by 
the government and employers, but also the union powers that in-
dependent unions might themselves eventually need to invoke 
(such as the right to force workers to pay dues).  It might be in the 
interest of workers to keep some of the existing rules that empower 
them vis-à-vis employers and focus instead on changing the legal 
and institutional context that makes those rules work in such un-
democratic ways.  So, the effort could be directed towards disen-
tangling the unions’ governance institutions from government con-
trol, or towards establishing conditions of fair competition among 
unions. 
Consider for a moment an agenda that, instead of rallying 
around the right to freedom of association, focused on experiment-
ing with the combinations of institutions and rules that can better 
 
81 See U.S. NAO Public Submission US2005-01 from the Washington Office on 
Latin America, to U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs (Feb. 17, 2005), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/submissions/Sub2005 
-01.htm (requesting that, inter alia, the U.S. National Administrative Office work 
with the Mexican government to eliminate alleged NAALC violations in the labor 
law reform proposal); see also Letter from José Miguel Vivanco, Executive Direc-
tor, Americas Division of Human Rights Watch, and Carol Pier, Labor Rights and 
Trade Researcher for Human Rights Watch, to Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies, 
(February Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/09 
/mexico10156.htm (alleging that the reform proposal “not only fails to remedy 
key shortcomings in Mexican labor law, but it weakens existing protections”). 
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guarantee conditions for unions’ democratic life.  By what 
yardstick will we measure democracy in the workplace?  What are 
the effects and benefits we foresee in terms of workers’ participa-
tion in their unions internal organization and in their unions’ nego-
tiations with management?  What sort of remedies must be made 
available for workers against unions, for unions against other un-
ions, and for unions against employers?  This is a hard discussion 
to articulate, or even imagine, in terms of rights, let alone the right 
to freedom of association. 82  
3. THE LIMITS OF THE LABOR LAW DEBATE AND THE NEED FOR A 
NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I illustrate the limits of these dominant discur-
sive positions through an analysis of the closed shop agreement.  
The closed shop represents an extreme version of a labor law rule 
that has triggered much discussion and has polarized scholars, po-
litical parties, and a variety of actors in the labor market.  This ex-
ample illustrates how the discursive positions I have described 
frame the public discussion and foreclose an analysis that could 
look more carefully at the potential effects of reforms.  Equally im-
portant, I argue that by framing the debate around these rigid posi-
tions, the realm of the possible appears as a menu of ready-made 
alternatives, which precludes a more imaginative debate that can 
lead to institutional innovation.   
3.1. Illustrating the Constraints in the Current Debate:  The 
Constitutionality of the Closed Shop 
The discussion about democracy in labor relations has been 
largely carried out in the language of rights, and it is framed as an 
argument about the nature of constitutional rights.  A prominent 
example is the controversial question of whether the exclusion 
 
82 There are various private associations devoted to addressing these ques-
tions.  The Association for Union Democracy, for instance, a non-profit association 
devoted to promoting union internal democracy and fighting union corruption 
throughout North America has an agenda that focuses on participation, freedom 
of press and representation in the everyday life of the unions.  They provide ad-
vice to unions on how to strengthen democratic life within the union, focusing on 
fair and frequent elections, access to information, leadership accountability, and 
several other internal aspects of union life.  See THE ASS’N FOR UNION DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.uniondemocracy.org/index.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
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clause—which enables the closed shop83—is consistent with the 
constitutional right to freedom of association.   
A few years ago, Mexico’s Supreme Court declared that the 
Federal Labor Law rule enabling the inclusion of the closed shop in 
collective agreements was unconstitutional because it violated 
workers’ right to freedom of association.84  In that case, the Court 
decided that the rule violated the negative aspect of that right.  If 
and when that decision becomes binding,85 it will severely under-
mine a rule giving workers considerable power against employers.  
The court determined that this right guarantees every worker the 
freedom to become part of a union, withdraw from a union, or not 
associate at all.86   
Advocates of the rights-based position oppose the closed shop 
agreement, arguing that it violates the individual right to freedom 
of association.  Their view is that individual rights should prevail 
and that the Court does well in restricting any legislative clause 
that impinges upon individual liberty.  The neoliberal position also 
 
83 Article 395 of the Federal Labor Law (“FLL”) enables workers and employ-
ers to stipulate two types of clauses in collective contracts, commonly known as 
exclusion clauses.  In the first clause (exclusion clause by admission), the employ-
er agrees to hire union members exclusively.  By virtue of the second clause (ex-
clusion clause by separation, hereinafter “closed shop”), the employer agrees to 
dismiss workers who resign from the union or are expelled from it.  See Ley Fed-
eral del Trabajo [LFT] [Federal Labor Law], art. 395, Diario Oficial de la Federa-
ción [DO], 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.). 
84 The Court held that Articles 395 and 413 of the Ley Federal del Trabajo 
(“LFT”) are unconstitutional in their section enabling the establishment of the ex-
clusion clause by separation in collective agreements.  The Court declared that such 
provisions violate Articles 5, 9 and 123, title A, section XVI of the Political Consti-
tution of the United Mexican States.  Amparo directo en revisión 1124/-2000.  See 
Abel Hernández Rivera y otros, Suprema Corta de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme 
Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XII, 
Mayo de 2001, Tesis 2a. LVII/2001, Página 321 (Mex.). 
85 For a decision to become binding precedent upon all other tribunals, it 
needs to establish “jurisprudencia,” which is formed when five subsequent deci-
sions establish the same criterion of interpretation.  See Ley Organica del Poder 
Judicial de la Federación [LOPJF] [Organic Law of the Federal Judiciary], as amen-
ded, Articulo Transitorio Decimo Quinto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 26 
de Mayo de 1995 (Mex.).  Jurisprudencia can also be established when the plenary 
of the Supreme Court resolves contradictory rulings by Supreme Court Chambers 
or by inferior courts.  For an excellent discussion on how jurisprudencia is 
formed, see STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 84-87 (2004). 
86 See Amparo directo en revisión 1124-2000.  Abel Hernández Rivera y otros, 
Suprema Corta de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Fe-
deración y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XII, Mayo de 2001, Tesis 2a. 
LVII/2001, Página 321, 426 (Mex.). 
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opposes the closed shop as a mechanism that increases unioniza-
tion rates and leads to inefficient outcomes.  It must be noted, 
however, that opposing the closed shop is also in tension with the 
neoliberal defense of freedom of contract since a ban on the closed 
shop is an imposition on the unions’ and employer’s ability to con-
tract.   
In contrast, those espousing the social position usually support 
the closed shop.  They argue that the Mexican Constitution should 
be interpreted in light of its underlying social objectives.  Thus, col-
lective rights should take precedence over individual rights.  Sup-
porters of the closed shop concede that the closed shop agreement 
impinges upon the individual right to freedom of association.  
However, in light of the constitution’s social objectives, the closed 
shop agreement should be deemed consistent with a collective 
right to freedom of association and it should prevail even if it im-
pinges upon individual rights.  They point to much earlier Su-
preme Court decisions where this was indeed the predominant po-
sition.87  Nevertheless, after years of the social interpretation’s 
dominance, the winds now fill the sails of those favoring the pre-
cedence of individual rights.   
Thus, the discussion about the closed shop revolves mainly 
around whether the different labor actors favor or resist democra-
cy.  Not much attention is given to whether eliminating the rule 
would facilitate or obstruct economically efficient outcomes or en-
hance workers’ tangible freedom—both important concerns of the 
neoliberal position—or what effect eliminating the rule would 
have on workers’ abilities to organize and voice their demands—of 
interest to advocates of the social position.  The criterion to decide 
whether the rule enhances or hinders democracy seems to be based 
on whether the rule is constitutional or not.  Under this standard, a 
labor law reform that eliminates the rule would be pro-democratic 
whereas one that keeps the closed shop would be deemed as cor-
poratist or anti-democratic.   
 
87 There are more than sixteen decisions in which parties sought the Court’s 
protection of their constitutional rights, allegedly breached in the application of 
the closed shop agreement, but in which the constitutionality of the closed shop 
was not challenged.  These cases reveal the overwhelming extent to which the 
closed shop was assumed to be considered constitutional by both courts and law-
yers since at least 1943.  See generally Amparo directo en revisión 1124-2000; Abel 
Hernández Rivera y otros, Suprema Corta de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], 
Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XII, Mayo 
de 2001, Tesis 2a. LVII/2001, Página 321, 415-24 (Mex.). 
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It seems hard to move away from the narrowness of the rights-
based position.  As it is currently articulated, it promises to break 
up the corporatist heritage of present institutions but at the same 
time runs the risk of importantly weakening workers’ power and 
capacity to organize.  Moreover, these changes could also translate 
into deeper economic insecurity for large groups of workers and 
there is no guarantee that the economic effects for the country will 
be positive.  The following section will show the rights-based posi-
tions’ conceptual problems and suggest a better way to pursue the 
democratic aspiration while foregoing that position’s current limi-
tations.   
In my view, the democratization of collective bargaining insti-
tutions should be embraced wholeheartedly.  There is no reason 
why the manifestation of society’s democratic ideals should be li-
mited to periodic elections for government positions, the internal 
life of political parties, and their competition for public office.  This 
democratic aspiration should reach the workplace.  It should seek 
to transform the governance structure of firms making the 
workplace a meaningful sphere of action, where workers can par-
ticipate in decisions, develop skills, and find personal fulfillment in 
the work they do.  Furthermore, I do not support the closed shop 
per se, and if nothing were to change in the current Mexican collec-
tive relations system, I think abolishing this institution would 
probably enhance democracy.  However, the knee-jerk rejection 
against the closed shop is a symptom of the poverty of our debate 
about democracy, rather than the solution that would advance it.  
3.2. A Critique of the Equation of Democracy with the Right to 
Freedom of Association 
By and large, scholars have taken the terms of the debate for 
granted and discussed the closed shop in terms of whether it is 
constitutional or not, and more concretely, whether it violates the 
right to freedom of association.  Most scholars have argued that the 
court is right and that the decision is constitutional, with rare nota-
ble exceptions.  However, this debate has been largely unproduc-
tive, with advocates and opponents ruminating over the nature of 
rights and fighting over which side holds the correct interpretation.   
The Supreme Court pointed out several times in the Abel 
Hernández Rivera case that it was deciding a hotly contested issue 
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through an exercise of judicial interpretation.88  While the Court 
admitted that is was deciding an issue for which the Constitution 
provided no definite answer, it nevertheless portrayed its interpre-
tation as politically neutral and as coherent with the Mexican con-
stitutional system.  Alleging that it was interpreting the general 
principles of law contained in the Constitution and Mexican labor 
laws, the Court arrived at conclusions that were the polar oppo-
sites of what those very principles had been held to mean for dec-
ades.   
The court explicitly refused to engage in questions of policy.  It 
refused to consider claims defending the purpose of the closed 
shop agreement in light of its application in labor relations.  Simi-
larly, it declined to analyze the likely consequences of altering or 
eliminating the closed shop in the present case as well as in future 
cases.  The Court stated that the foreseeable “abusive” conduct that 
could occur in the “incorrect” application of the constitution or 
when it was interpreted against its “authentic” meaning could not 
be considered in the analysis.  These potential consequences were 
completely ignored in the legal analysis of the constitutionality of 
the laws in question.89   
The Court’s position in this case can be understood as a reac-
tion against decades of governance by a State-party political re-
gime that was able to exercise enormous control through legal me-
chanisms like the one the Court is reviewing.  In the whole 
decision, there is only a brief passage where the Court refers to pol-
icy considerations.  The Court considers arguments against pre-
serving the closed shop referring to “[Union] leaders who seek on-
ly their personal benefit and not that of workers, which can be 
 
88 The Court laid out what it considered the correct method of constitutional 
interpretation.  It affirmed that in order to decide whether the disputed provisions 
of the Labor Law breached the Constitution, they should be confronted with the 
relevant constitutional provisions and their legal interpretation.  This required re-
ferring to the text of these constitutional provisions as well as to their meaning.  
This implies that meaning should be revealed by referring to the link between 
these provisions and other related provisions, previous judicial decisions, and the 
main principles governing Mexican labor law.  In this interpretative process, the 
Court held that attention should be paid to the Constitutional Assembly and the 
legislator.  The Court also noted that legal scholars’ writing can be helpful, espe-
cially when they are coherent with the previous elements.  See Suprema Corta de 
Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, 
Novena Época, tomo XII, Mayo de 2001, Tesis 2a. LVIII/2001, Página 442 (Mex.).   
89 See Suprema Corta de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial 
de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XII, Mayo de 2001, Tesis 2a. 
LVII/2001, Página 322, 439–40 (Mex.).  
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reflected politically through mechanisms of corporatist manipula-
tion.90   
The Court also referred to the potential consequences of elimi-
nating the closed shop, such as the weakening of unions, which 
“could be used by firms to the detriment of workers”.91  To be sure, 
the Court vehemently emphasized that these effects should not be 
taken into account when deciding whether to keep or dispose of 
the closed shop.   
In this section, I offer a critique of the constitutional rights 
framework based on legal realist analysis and public choice theory.  
The legal realist analysis explains the incompleteness and indeter-
minacy of the claim of unconstitutionality while public choice ex-
plains why workers actually need the closed shop if their right to 
freedom of association is to be meaningful.  Both aspects of this 
analysis are based on U.S. scholarship, which has grappled with 
similar problems.  In the United States, the closed shop has been 
significantly weakened on rights-based grounds, but there remains 
a lively scholarly tradition critiquing these grounds from which we 
can gain insight in order to evaluate the merits of the rights-based 
objection to the closed shop.   
3.2.1. Legal Realist Analysis 
The rights-based framework of analysis is likely to prove par-
ticularly unhelpful, in the larger—and more important—quest for a 
democratic workplace.  The association of particular rights with 
freedom and democracy relies on a formalistic understanding of 
law that assumes that it is possible to deduce a determinate out-
come from an abstract right and then equates that outcome with 
individual freedom and democracy.  Using a legal realist ap-
proach,92 I critique the conflation of rights with democracy, instead 
 
90 See Suprema Corta de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial 
de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XII, Mayo de 2001, Tesis 2a. 
LVII/2001, p. Página 322, 440 (Mex.) (author’s translation).   
91 Id.  
92 My analysis draws from the American legal realist tradition, challenging 
the possibility of a Langdellian legal science in which “correct” legal outcomes 
could be “discovered” or obtained from abstract legal principles.  See generally 
Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV 457 (1897); Id. Privilege, 
Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894-1895) (criticizing “hollow deductions 
from empty general propositions”); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821–34 (1935); Llewellyn, supra note 26 
at 1222; see also Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting); Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 
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suggesting that rights, and particularly the right to freedom of as-
sociation, do not dictate the wholesale rejection of the closed shop 
per se.   
Legal theory has long made us aware that rights are not abso-
lute.  They do not translate into absolute entitlements that all par-
ties enjoy simultaneously at all times in a seamless world.  Rather, 
rights consist of a “bundle” of entitlements whose enjoyment often 
brings parties into conflict with one another.  Rights are relational.  
As with the analysis of any right, the real interest lies in the differ-
ent entitlements that each party derives from it.  In the case at 
hand, the right of a group of workers to unionize and to guarantee 
their continued association through the closed shop conflicts with 
the rights of those workers who do not want to unionize.  In turn, 
by exercising their entitlement to not associate, those workers jeo-
pardize the entitlement of the workers who want to unionize but 
fear employers’ reprisal or discharge.  The abstract right of every-
one’s freedom of association does not resolve the issue, and there is 
no way of deducing a concrete “correct” answer from this general 
right.   
Besides analytical indeterminacy, this approach can backfire 
from a strategic point of view when workers start demanding the 
inclusion of rules or compulsory clauses in the employment con-
tract deemed to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis employ-
ers.  Such clauses can just as likely be considered unconstitutional 
because they would violate the employers’ right to freedom of con-
tract.  No doubt such restrictions impose limitations on employers’ 
liberties.  However, they do so aiming to guarantee workers’ en-
joyment of their liberties, when material conditions and the parties’ 
asymmetry of bargaining power would otherwise render workers’ 
liberties null.  Indeed, the whole creation of labor legislation is a 
prime example of the recognition that freedoms, and their particu-
lar expressions, such as freedom of contract, are not absolute but 
relational.  Thus, to articulate a democratic agenda solely in terms 
of rights is to reenergize a blind faith in the equation of formal 
rights with individual freedom, the limits of which labor legisla-
 
YALE L.J. 779 (1917-1918) (illustrating in two labor injunction cases how a policy 
decision was reached supposedly on merely logical grounds); Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 
YALE L.J. 16 (1913-1914) (developing an analytical framework to challenge com-
mon misuses of logical deduction and clarify the relational character of rights and 
other legal entitlements); Kelman, supra note 30. 
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tion set out to expose a century ago.  But more importantly, it is an 
agenda that might not deliver.   
These policy questions are unavoidable, and courts and legisla-
tors will confront them, no matter how thickly veiled.  By deciding 
whose right to freedom of association gets priority, the court is de-
ciding these policy questions.  Resorting to rights’ interpretation 
does not end the political disagreement, as is made clear by the 
conflicting positions on what the constitutional right to freedom of 
association is supposed to mean.  It only takes the debate to the 
rights’ arena, where parties are compelled to channel their view-
points in terms of plausible interpretations of the right to freedom 
of association.   
However, an important gain from having a debate about labor 
reform is precisely to debate questions about the consequences and 
desirability of collective bargaining institutions openly.  We should 
argue about the potential effects of keeping or eliminating the 
closed shop on different groups of workers and types of firms, ra-
ther than reproduce a discussion by reference to rights that does 
more to eschew than confront the choices and alternatives at hand.   
Unfortunately, many legal scholars have generally followed 
suit, accepting the courts’ terms and engaging in a debate as to 
whether the closed shop violates the constitutional right to free-
dom of association.93  An important number of scholars agree with 
the court on the unconstitutionality of the closed shop.94  A notable 
exception is Néstor De Buen, a preeminent labor law scholar, who 
has argued that the closed shop is constitutional.  But most notable 
is his willingness to talk about the closed shop’s effects.  Thus, he 
has criticized the court for doing a very poor legal analysis but 
nevertheless celebrated the outcome of the decision.  According to 
De Buen, “the exclusion clauses are constitutional but they are also 
a disgrace.”95  In this form, De Buen might be articulating what 
 
93 See, e.g., LIBERTAD SINDICAL: CLÁUSULA DE EXCLUSIÓN (Patricia Kurczyn and 
María Carmen Macías Vázquez eds., Univ. Nacional Autónoma de México, 2002). 
94 See Néstor de Buen, Notas Perversas Sobre Una Ejecutoria Mal Concebida Sobre 
Cláusulas de Exclusión, in LIBERTAD SINDICAL: CLÁUSULA DE EXCLUSIÓN 5, 20–25 (Pa-
tricia Kurczyn and & María Carmen Macías Vázquez eds., 2002) (analyzing the 
opinions of several noted labor scholars—before and after the court’s decision—
who think the closed shop is unconstitutional).  See also José Manuel Lastra Lastra, 
Inconstitucionalidad de la Cláusula de Exclusión, in LIBERTAD SINDICAL: CLÁUSULA DE 
EXCLUSIÓN 39, 53–55 (Patricia Kurczyn & María Carmen Macías Vázquez eds., 
2002) (sampling opinions on union-security agreements). 
95 Néstor de Buen, supra note 73, at 25 (author’s translation). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SANTOS.DOC 11/23/2010 3:55 PM 
160 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
many scholars think but do not want to say in the current debate.  
His most important critique is that the closed shop has enabled a 
corporatist alliance between employers and the leadership of tradi-
tional unions, with the government’s approval and even encou-
ragement, at the expense of workers.96  Thus, De Buen regards the 
elimination of the closed shop as an important step toward decen-
tralization of unions’ power and the strengthening of union de-
mocracy.97  But this view, and alternatives to it, about economic 
and social consequences of particular institutions can hardly be 
debated by reference to rights. 
3.2.2. Public Choice Theory Analysis 
To understand why the closed shop is so important to unions 
we need to look at the kinds of goods that unions provide.  In The 
Logic of Collective Action, the late economist Mancur Olson explains 
that unions provide “public goods” that create a free-rider prob-
lem.  This problem can be effectively addressed by the closed shop.  
For Olson, compulsory unionization is, in fact, a coercive mechan-
ism but is also indispensable for unions’ success and crucial to un-
ions’ existence.  Furthermore, this compulsion is necessary for any 
organization that seeks to provide public or collective goods, be-
cause otherwise no individual would have incentives to contribute 
to the provision of goods that she would get regardless of her ef-
forts.  Olson remarks: 
This general reliance on compulsory membership should be 
expected, for labor unions are typically large organizations 
that strive for benefits for large or latent groups.  A labor 
union works primarily to get higher wages, better working 
conditions, legislation favorable to workers, and the like; 
these things by their very nature ordinarily cannot be with-
held from any particular worker in the group represented 
by the union. [. . .] It follows that most of the achievements 
of a union, even if they were more impressive than the 
staunchest unionist claims, could offer the rational worker 
no incentive to join; his individual efforts would not have a 
 
96 Id. at 19. 
97 Néstor de Buen authored a constitutional amendment to Article 123A and 
a labor law reform proposal with Carlos E. de Buen Unna for PAN, presented on 
July 12th, 1995, in which both types of exclusion clauses were eliminated.  See LA 
REFORMA LABORAL QUE NECESITAMOS, supra note 73. 
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noticeable effect on the outcome, and whether he supported 
the union or not he would still get the benefits of its 
achievements.98   
According to Olson, compulsory unionization was key to un-
ions’ growth in numbers and geographic influence and contributed 
to their success in becoming national organizations.99  It is often ar-
gued that compulsory unionization undermines individual free-
dom.  But the question should not be whether compulsory unioni-
zation restricts individual freedom—it certainly does—but rather, 
whose freedom does it restrict?  Assume a unionized firm where 
there is no closed shop rule.  There are a considerable number of 
workers who choose not to join the union.  Imagine that the union 
goes on strike to demand better working conditions.  If non-
unionized workers decide to break the strike, union workers will 
be coerced to end the strike and forego better working conditions 
or lose their jobs.  Non-unionized workers will have plenty of in-
centives to break the strike.  For instance, they will not need to fo-
rego wages, which will probably become higher, and they are also 
likely to receive luring offers from employers to continue working.  
Thus, just as compulsory unionization coerces workers who oth-
erwise would choose not to join the union, a prohibition against 
compulsory unionization coerces unionized workers to end strikes 
or settle for less than they would otherwise choose to.100   
 
98 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 76 (2nd ed. 1971). 
99 See id. at 69 (“Compulsory membership . . . can account for the viability of 
the later, larger, national unions that the local unions ultimately created.”).   
100 See id. at 71 (“Should it be surprising, then, that coercion should be ap-
plied to keep individual workers from succumbing to the temptation to work dur-
ing the strike?”); see, e.g., Pattern Makers League of North America v. NLRB, 473 
U.S. 95 (1985) (ruling that workers can resign membership in their union at any 
time without penalty–even during an active strike–notwithstanding limits on res-
ignation set forth in union governing documents).  Justice Blackmun’s dissenting 
opinion sheds light on the Court’s reorientation toward individual rights at the 
expense of collective rights envisioned by the NLRA:  
By focusing exclusively on the right to refrain from collective active, by 
assuming an arid and artificial conception of the proviso circumscribing 
that right, and by ignoring Congress’ intentions in promulgating the 
NLRA in the first instance, the Board and the Court abandon their prop-
er role as mediators between any conflicting interests protected by labor 
laws.  In the name of protecting individual worker’s rights to violate 
their contractual agreements, the Court debilitates the right of all work-
ers to take effective collective action. 
Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 113 (J. Blackmun, dissenting). 
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In the United States, the claim that compulsory unionization 
undermines workers’ freedom-of-association rights is usually 
framed in terms of workers’ right to work.  State laws prohibiting 
compulsory unionization are thus typically referred to as right-to-
work laws.  The right-to-work argument, Olson notes, relies on an 
analogy with private business and the underlying profit motive 
that animates businessmen and consumers.  The idea is that just as 
a “firm must please its customers if it is to retain their patronage,” 
a union should be able to resist the test of an open shop and attract 
potential members based on its performance and the goods it of-
fers.101  But if that profit motive also stimulates workers, “the en-
forcement of ‘right-to-work’ laws would bring about the death of 
trade unions.”102  No rational worker would willingly contribute to 
a union providing a collective benefit, since its individual contribu-
tion would not seem to make a difference and he would be able to 
enjoy the benefit anyway.103  Thus, Olson dismisses the arguments 
against compulsory unionization that are based on “rights:” 
Arguments about compulsory union membership in terms 
of “rights” are therefore misleading and unhelpful.  There 
are of course many intelligent arguments against unions 
and the union shop.  But none of them can rest alone on the 
premise that the union shop and other forms of compulsory 
unionism restrict individual freedom, unless the argument 
is extended to cover all coercion used to support the provi-
sion of collective services.  There is no less infringement of 
“rights” through taxation for the support of a police force 
or a judicial system than there is in a union shop.  Of 
course, law and order are requisites of all organized eco-
nomic activity; the police force and the judicial system are 
therefore presumably more vital to a country than labor un-
ions.  But this only puts the argument on the proper 
grounds: do the results of the unions’ activities justify the 
power that society has given them?  The debate on the 
 
101 Olson, supra note 98, at 88. 
102 Id.  
103 See OLSON, supra note 98, at 88; Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor 
Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2789–90 (1991) (ar-
guing that the “public goods” nature of a variety of workplace goods would war-
rant imposing collective bargaining decisions, or state regulation, on non-
consenting employees in order to reach efficient outcomes). 
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“right-to-work” laws should center, not around the “rights” 
involved, but on whether or not a country would be better 
off if its unions were stronger or weaker.104   
One might still argue that coercion by the government should 
be permissible whereas coercion by a union—a private entity—
should not.  But this is not an important distinction.  The govern-
ment is capable of providing non-collective goods, such as those 
traditionally provided by private enterprise without curtailing 
economic freedom.  The crucial distinction, therefore, lies not on 
the character of the entity providing the good—whether it is public 
or private—but on the nature of the goods provided—whether 
they are collective or not. 105    
There have been important theoretical responses to Olson’s 
analysis since the publication of The Logic of Collective Action.  The 
most powerful ones rely on behavioral experiments that challenge 
the assumption that individuals are self-interested wealth-
maximizers.  Games have shown that individuals are willing to 
cooperate at the expense of greater potential personal benefits they 
would obtain from free-riding if they chose not to cooperate.106  
However, several studies suggest that the level of free-riding is 
higher in right-to-work states than in those that allow union-
security agreements, seeming to confirm Olson’s analysis.107  High-
er levels of free-riding translate into lower demand for union 
membership, and higher costs for union members, potentially hin-
dering union growth.  In right-to-work states, unions are legally 
 
104 OLSON, supra note 98, at 88–89. 
105 See id. at 96.  It is worth noting that in the United States, courts have long-
considered the free-rider theory as a reason to support some form of union-
security agreement.  See, e.g., Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
106 See Benjamin L. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2685 (2007–2008) (discussing social science data that seems to challenge Olson’s 
theory); see also Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, 
in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION 
IN ECONOMIC LIFE 151, 165 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005) (analyzing the Prison-
er’s Dilemma in the context of a discussion about conditional cooperation); Dan 
M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 76–77 (2003) (exploring the dynamics of collective action problems and 
suggesting that promoting trust is a significant goal). 
107 See, e.g., Joe C. David & John H. Huston, Right-to-Work Laws and Free Rid-
ing, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 52 (1993) (“[T]he effect of right-to-work laws remains statis-
tically significant but of a smaller magnitude than found in previous studies.”).  
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forbidden to charge fees to non-union workers unwilling to pay.  
Therefore, in these states unions have less muscle to force all work-
ers in the firm to pay for the goods that unions obtain and that by 
law they are required to provide to all workers.  Moreover, a num-
ber of empirical studies have found that right-to-work laws have 
had a negative impact on union density.108  Studies have found that 
right-to-work laws have a negative effect on unionization and on 
the decline of national union membership in the private sector.109   
The erosion of union-security agreements is only one of the 
many changes in the labor law and doctrine that has contributed to 
the dramatic decrease in unionization rates in the United States 
during the second half of the twentieth century.110  There are other 
 
108 See, e.g., Raymond Hogler et al., Right-To-Work Legislation, Social Capital, 
and Variations in State Union Density, 34 THE REV. OF REGIONAL STUD. 95, 109 (2004). 
RTW [right-to-work] laws reduce the ability of unions to organize work-
ers and to develop workplace institutions conducive to collective bar-
gaining.  Even after taking account of the social and labor relations con-
texts within which unions function, RTW laws significantly reduce union 
density.  Our findings show that RTW laws exert an independent and 
strongly negative effect on union density, with a magnitude of 8.8 per-
centage point, ceteris paribus.  This is a true legislative impact, not an arti-
fact of underlying anti-union attitudes. 
Id. 
109 See William J. Moore, The Determinants and Effects of Right-To-Work Laws: A 
Review of the Recent Literature, 19 J. LAB. RES. 445, 450 (1998) (finding that right-to-
work laws tend to have an effect on unionization, free riding, and state industrial 
development in the short-run, but most likely not on wages, and identifying right-
to-work laws as “an important factor causing the post-1950s decline in private sec-
tor national union membership”).  William J. Moore and Robert J. Newman, The 
Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the literature, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
571 (1985). 
110 The importance of union security agreements on unionization rates de-
pends on the institutional context in which they operate.  In European countries 
with the Ghent model (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) where union 
density is significantly higher than the United States, there is no legislation pro-
viding for union-security agreements.  However, union administration of national 
unemployment insurance provides powerful incentives for workers to join un-
ions.  See Matthew Dimick, Paths To Power:  Labor Law, Union Density, and The 
Ghent System, Oct. 11, 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1680900).  Some observers have argued that union-security agreements have 
made unions complacent and less responsive to the rank and file and non-union 
members in the United States.  See, e.g., Thomas Geoghegan, Ten Things Dems 
Could Do to Win, THE NATION, Sept. 27, 2010 (arguing that one way to re-energize 
the labor movement would be “to let people opt out and make [union] member-
ship voluntary” assuming the risk of free riders).  According to Geoghegan, how-
ever, this reform would need to be accompanied by other institutional changes, 
like amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and ending the filibuster rule in the Se-
nate to avoid blockage of labor-friendly laws.  The right to join—or not to join—a 
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rules which have had an impact, possibly of greater magnitude, on 
the decline of unions, including rules governing unionization and 
employer opposition to it, and the employer’s right to permanently 
replace employees on strike.111  As labor protections decreased 
through a combination of statutes and judicial interpretation,112 
workers have less effective mechanisms to organize and unions 
have fewer means to encourage workers to join them.  Workers’ 
remedies to counter employers’ anti-union practices have been 
weakened.  As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to form 
unions and union membership has declined.   
3.3. Proposed Model 
The description of the three predominant positions in the first 
section of this paper can serve as a good roadmap with which to 
understand these debates in both the United States and Mexico.  
The model of institutional analysis that I develop retains some 
elements of each of these rhetorical positions and rejects others.  
From the “social” position, this analysis retains the fundamental 
notion that labor law should be concerned with the balance of 
power and the regulation of conflict between parties in the em-
ployment relationship.  Therefore, the analysis preserves the inter-
est in affecting the distribution between labor and capital.  It re-
jects, however, the emphasis on the supposedly national origin and 
politically progressive character of labor regulation.  Thus, it seeks 
to overcome the reluctance to analyze the intra-class and inter-
gender distributive consequences of labor regulation that is veiled 
behind claims of nationalism and general welfare of the working 
class. 
 
union would be a civil right that workers could exercise in court against employ-
ers’ actions to block a union, under an amended Civil Rights Act.  In this scheme, 
according to Geoghegan, unions would be more eager to promote themselves and 
please their members so they can collect dues.  
111 See Estlund, supra note 62, at 1536-38. 
112 See generally id. at 1530–35 (arguing that American labor law has become 
rigid due to its continued foundation in decades-old statutes kept in place by po-
litical gridlock, which prevents democratic renewal and local innovation); Get-
man, supra note 52 (proposing a legislative agenda that would be more worker-
friendly and eliminate perceived weaknesses of the National Labor Relations Act); 
Karl E. Klare, supra note 52, at 293 (1978) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s 
decisions interpreting the Wagner Act contributed to the integration of the Ameri-
can labor movement into the capitalist order in the years following World War II). 
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From the social position, we could retain the proposition that 
any workplace regulation must be attentive to the actual asymme-
tries of power between the parties to the employment contract, ra-
ther than assume formal equality.  To a great extent, labor regula-
tion is about the management of conflict between employers and 
workers.  This conflict arises from competing interests in the con-
trol of production, workplace organization, and distribution of re-
sources.  Thus, according to social advocates, labor regulation must 
be concerned with conflict management and distribution in the 
pursuit of social justice.  These are all considerations worth taking 
into account in the analysis.  
However, the social position should be opened to important 
criticisms concerning the effects of labor regulation.  It should ac-
cept that there are often competing interests within the working 
class and take up the challenge to respond to critics of labor regula-
tion who argue that it hurts the people it is trying to help.  In short, 
the social position needs to overcome its reluctance to analyze in-
tra-class and inter-gender distributive consequences of labor regu-
lation.  Unfortunately, it has often failed to do so, attempting in-
stead, to appeal to the unity and welfare of the working class as a 
whole.  Moreover, those defending current regulation in Mexico, 
frequently resort to the supposedly national origin of social and la-
bor rights and their inherently progressive character.113  They refer 
to the original social aspirations of the Constitution in support of 
the status quo.  The existing regime is thus treated as a matter of 
national and cultural pride that should be preserved.114  Critiques 
of the current regulation are thus often dismissed as being moti-
vated by foreign transplants, as inherently conservative, or both.  
These claims of originalism and progressiveness preclude a serious 
engagement with these criticisms and should be discarded. 
From the “neoliberal” position, my analysis maintains the em-
phasis on the importance of looking at intra-class and inter-gender 
distributive consequences of collective bargaining regulation.  It 
seeks to explore the effects of a union regime on non-unionized 
workers and on informal workers and the effect in each of these 
 
113 It should be noted that even if labor regulation was indeed a national crea-
tion and politically progressive for its time—claims that are contestable—these 
reasons alone are insufficient to defend it today.  
114 This is Mexico’s own version of originalism and an example of how origi-
nalism need not have a determinate political tilt: politically left in the case of Mex-
ico and right in the United States.   
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categories across gender lines.  Moreover, the analysis retains the 
focus on economic growth in the evaluation and design of labor 
norms.  The analysis, however, rejects the reductionist understand-
ing of how the law affects the relative bargaining power of work-
ers.  Finally, it also resists the simple-minded economic analysis 
that assumes that a one-time increase in efficiency will generate 
growth, rather than just another efficient equilibrium level. 
From the “rights-based” position, I retain the fundamental 
proposition that the legal system needs to be open to the political 
aspirations of multiple actors in society.  Regulation of the 
workplace and of collective bargaining is part of the governance 
structure of society and needs to be open to and justified by what a 
democratic process defines as society’s ideals.  However, my anal-
ysis rejects the formalist and pre-realist understanding of law that 
assumes that it is possible to deduce a determinate outcome from 
rights. 
In the example of the closed shop, the “social” approach helps 
us stress the need to preserve the rules that guarantee the closed 
shop and empower workers.  It focuses on the effective enforce-
ment of law against employers’ anti-union practices.  A “neoliber-
al” analysis urges us to consider the effects of the closed shop on 
non-unionized workers and on workers in the informal economy.  
The “rights-based” position encourages us to think of mechanisms 
that transform the workplace into a sphere where workers can 
voice their views and participate meaningfully.  It is a bid for the 
workers’ involvement in the governance of workplace institutions. 
Thus far, this Article has focused on analyzing the discursive 
positions and challenging the assumptions that frame the debate in 
order to pave the way for an investigation of alternative reform 
proposals.  In the remaining part of this Article, I seek to illustrate 
how this legal realist and post-realist analysis of the closed shop 
can help us move the debate beyond these entrenched positions.  I 
adopt the legal realists’ insights about the role of the state in “pri-
vate law-making” and the structure of the market in order to clari-
fy the distributive effects of the law in labor relations.115  The first 
step in this analysis is to identify the different groups involved in 
the market and propose some categories, such as men and women, 
 
115 I appropriate here a post-realist methodology as developed by Duncan 
Kennedy.  DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of the Law, or Hale and Foucault, in SEXY 
DRESSING ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 83, 86-87 
(1993). 
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white and non-white, juniors and seniors, urban and rural, 
unionized and not unionized.  The second step consists of identify-
ing the institutional arrangements that affect these actors.  For this 
kind of analysis, two types of norms become relevant: first, “the 
rules governing the conduct of the parties during bargaining” that 
directly increase or decrease their power, and second, “the rules 
that structure the alternatives to remaining in the bargaining situa-
tion.”116 
Following this conceptual framework, we can imagine a sub-
stantially different debate.  We can see that the rules that guarantee 
security and those which enhance flexibility are not in simple op-
position with regard to their distributive effects on workers and 
employers.  Rather, these rules can be deemed to have asymmetric 
effects among different groups of workers and employers.  For in-
stance, the relaxation on dismissal restrictions accompanied by a 
proliferation of part-time employment contracts could potentially 
benefit young workers and women but jeopardize the job security 
of senior workers. 
It would be important to analyze the effects of norms protect-
ing specific groups of workers and their interaction with norms 
that impose restrictions on the levels of employment and wages.  
The consequences of these protective norms will largely depend on 
how stringent the resulting restrictions on employment and wages 
are.  Their effects would be felt asymmetrically between the pro-
tected and the unprotected workers with benefits accruing to some 
workers at the expense of others rather than just to the employ-
ers.117  This discussion, however, is almost impossible to have un-
der the current debate because workers and employers are concep-
tualized as solidly coherent groups with interests that clash 
between them and not within them. 
At the same time, the regulation’s effect on different kinds of 
workers will largely depend on the structure of collective bargain-
ing.  The common argument that labor costs need to be reduced to 
increase competitiveness often assumes that labor should bear the 
costs of increased productivity.  However once a given productivi-
 
116 Id. at 87.  
117 See generally Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 
(2000–2001) (outlining a new model analyzing distributive effects of protections 
on specific groups).  Jolls analyzes how restrictions on relative wages and relative 
employment levels imposed by antidiscrimination law fundamentally alter how 
special protections—the accommodation mandates—affect the wages and em-
ployment levels of accommodated workers as well as non-protected workers.  Id. 
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ty level assures competitiveness, the joint product can be divided 
into a myriad of different ways and this partition will be greatly 
determined by the bargaining power of labor and capital, which is 
in turn influenced by the background legal rules.118  
4. AN EXERCISE IN INSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION119 
Imagine what debates about labor reform would be like if we 
were to move beyond the blind spots caused by the discursive po-
sitions.  Imagine, for example, that we retain the closed shop in la-
bor regulation while at the same time radically democratizing col-
lective labor relations.  Let me emphasize that this is only a 
thought-experiment, intended to illustrate how, even in the more 
extreme cases, adopting a different analytical framework can help 
us to imagine a set of alternative institutions and trigger a discus-
sion where the effects of the institutional choices are more overtly 
disclosed. 
Those rejecting the institution of the closed shop usually con-
sider the system of collective bargaining as a whole and assume it 
to be indivisible.  They associate the current negative effects of the 
collective labor relations system with each of its constitutive parts.  
Under this perspective, the system should be replaced wholesale to 
democratize collective labor relations.  But there is no logical rea-
son why this should be the case.  Elements of the current system 
can be preserved and combined with new ones to achieve demo-
cratic objectives. 
4.1. Union Security Clauses (the Closed Shop) Revisited 
Discussion about the merits of the closed shop provokes very 
strong reactions among different groups in society.  It is a rule that 
deliberately allocates power among labor actors in ways that are 
subject to political and normative disagreement.  There are high 
stakes for the different groups involved.  The prominence of rights’ 
 
118 See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargain Analysis of American Labor 
Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419 
(1992) (presenting an alternative economic analysis of unions and collective bar-
gaining to demonstrate that increasing gains for workers can be obtained under 
competitive conditions). 
119 My interest in institutional experimentalism has been greatly stimulated 
by the work of Roberto Unger.  See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: 
ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); 
ROBERTO M. UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED, THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998). 
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discourse in this debate might be an indication that actors in this 
debate prefer to talk about rights that individuals have as man-
dated by a higher authority, such as the Constitution, which is 
deemed to stand above political disagreement.  In other words, re-
ferring to constitutional rights might be a way to avoid directly 
confronting the hard choices that the closed shop raises. 
The closed shop has acquired a bad name in Mexico because it 
has served to empower the leaders of official unions, who have ne-
gotiated with employers at the expense of the rank and file.  This 
rule has allowed union leaders to extract personal rents from em-
ployers in exchange for industrial peace in a way that has little to 
do with workers’ needs.  At the same time, it has made it very hard 
for workers to form independent unions. There is, however, noth-
ing necessary or inherent in the way the closed shop has devel-
oped.  I now proceed to explain the background setting in which 
the closed shop operates and highlight the way in which the goals 
of the closed shop have been perverted. 
The paramount mechanism through which employers and un-
ion leaders have colluded is the so-called protective contract (“con-
trato de protección”).  The name was coined to reflect the protection 
it grants to employers from workers’ collective action in practice.120  
This type of contract involves an employer signing a collective 
agreement with a union before the firm has even hired any em-
ployees.  Unions signing these agreements frequently exist only on 
paper, and the “union representatives” who broker and manage 
these agreements with employers treat them as licenses that they 
can sell or trade for good money.121  Employees working for firms 
under these contracts rarely know they are part of a union.  When 
they try to organize they find out that a union already exists, that 
they form part of it, and that their union is the title-holder of a col-
lective agreement stipulating their working conditions.  Under this 
framework, the exclusion clause works against the interests of 
workers.  They are dependent upon a leadership they did not elect 
and whose main interest is not to represent workers but to keep la-
bor costs at a minimum in exchange for rents.  If workers decide to 
 
120 See José Alfonso Bouzas Ortiz, Los Contratos de Protección y el Proyecto Ofi-
cial de Reforma Laboral, in AUGE Y PERSPECTIVAS DE LOS CONTRATOS DE PROTECCIÓN: 
¿CORRUPCIÓN SINDICAL O MAL NECESARIO? 159 (Inés González Nicolás, ed., 2006). 
121 See generally AUGE Y PERSPECTIVAS DE LOS CONTRATOS DE PROTECCIÓN: 
¿CORRUPCIÓN SINDICAL O MAL NECESARIO? (Inés González Nicolás, ed., 2006) (pro-
viding an overview of how protective contracts function). 
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leave the union, say to form a new one, the employer will fire 
them.  So, it is understandable that a number of activists and com-
mentators regard the exclusion clause as an important instrument 
of control that employers, employer-friendly unions and official 
unions use against independent-minded workers and unions. 
This diagnosis is important to understand the closed shop’s 
current detrimental effects.  In doing so, we must resist the knee-
jerk reaction against the closed shop and instead think about the 
combination of rules and practices that make the closed shop work 
in such pernicious ways.  On the one hand, workers are not 
represented by these unions and have no say in whatever condi-
tions are agreed upon.  On the other hand, employers buy control 
and stability, making sure there will be no strikes or demands for 
higher wages and benefits.122 
One of the main objectives of labor law is the facilitation of 
workers’ organization.  “Protective contracts” can be understood 
as an abuse of the relative easiness to organize provided by the le-
gal regime.  “Protective contracts” lock in the workplace making it 
harder, not easier, for workers to effectively organize and negotiate 
their employment conditions.  The problem lies not on the objec-
tive to ease workers’ organization, but on the current legal and in-
stitutional regime that makes practices like “protective contracts” 
possible.  Thus, the solution needs to focus on eradicating the prac-
tices that subvert the aim of easing organization, rather than dis-
posing of that aim.  A doctor in charge of a patient with an auto-
immune disease needs to target the defense system to cure the ill-
ness.  His aim is to cure the illness by changing the conditions un-
der which the defense system operates, not to destroy the defense 
system itself.  A patient without an immune system will have a 
hard time surviving.  By the same token, workers will have a hard 
time forming unions—of any type—and advancing their interests 
successfully without an institutional setting that facilitates their as-
sociation and provides defenses against the legitimate, but conflict-
ing, interests of employers. 
 
122 Not surprisingly, defenders of these contracts consist of corporatist unions 
and business leaders.  The former argue that due to their experience and expertise, 
they are the best sort of union to represent workers’ interests.  The latter argue 
that they are necessary to counteract lack of investment and job creation.  See 
Francisco Zapata Schaffeld, Los contratos de Protección: ¿Crisis del Sindicalismo Tra-
dicional u Opción de Cambio?, in AUGE Y PERSPECTIVAS DE LOS CONTRATOS DE 
PROTECCIÓN: ¿CORRUPCIÓN SINDICAL O MAL NECESARIO? 47, 50 (Inés González Ni-
colás coord., 2006). 
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4.2. The U.S. and Mexican Collective-Bargaining Systems in 
Perspective 
Following the model I outlined in Part 3.3 above, this section 
will discuss some key elements of the current collective bargaining 
system in Mexico and compare it to the United States.  The objec-
tive of this section is to highlight the bargaining rules that structure 
the behavior between employers and workers.  These are the rules 
of the game that govern the relationships between employers and 
workers, firms and unions every time they interact for purposes of 
deciding what the conditions at work should be.  By and large, 
these are procedural rules that establish what mechanisms are 
available to workers and employers to negotiate.  These are rules 
that define what “fair” game is: what kind of moves are allowed in 
the game, who determines when there is a fault, and what conse-
quences might follow from breaking the rules. 
It is common to think about these bargaining rules as forming 
part of a more or less coherent system of collective bargaining.  
Comparative labor law literature has made use of ideal types to 
contrast the differences between countries’ collective bargaining 
systems as a whole, as well as between particular institutions or 
rules.  Drawing on political science and industrial relations theory, 
comparative labor law scholars often classify collective bargaining 
systems in two main categories: corporatist and pluralist.123  These 
categories are by no means exclusive and indeed, there are other 
related classifications, such as centralized and contractualist, or vo-
luntaristic.  As soon as we take a comparative perspective, it be-
comes evident that there is important variation in the rules of the 
game adopted by other countries and thus, in the conditions under 
 
123 See Hugh Collins, Capitalist Discipline and Corporatist Law—Part I, 11 INDUS. 
L.J. 78 (1982); Hugh Collins, Capitalist Discipline and Corporatist Law—Part II, 11 
INDUS. L.J. 170 (1982).  In both articles, Collins distinguishes between three types 
of labor regulation: floor of rights, pluralistic, and corporatist.  The latter two 
structure different types of collective bargaining regimes.  For a definition of cor-
poratism, see Philippe C. Schmitter, Corporatism (Corporativism), in THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1988).  See Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. 
Schmitter, From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests 
in the Single European Market, 19 POL. & SOC’Y 133 (1991) (discussing the effects of 
corporatism on European capitalism).  For studies of corporatism in political 
theory, see ALAN CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986); HOWARD J. 
WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1997); HARMON ZEIGLER, 
PLURALISM, CORPORATISM, AND CONFUCIANISM (1988).  For studies on the pluralist 
type of collective bargaining, see ALAN FOX, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER, 
AND TRUST RELATIONS (1974).  
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which the parties play elsewhere.  Looking at a country’s institu-
tions in comparative perspective also challenges the “necessity” of 
what we often consider a fixed institutional arrangement. 
The analysis I propose relies on the insight that a collective 
bargaining system is not indivisible.  Rather, its constitutive ele-
ments can be changed and recombined to achieve a variety of ob-
jectives.  Collective bargaining institutions do not need to be 
adopted or replaced in toto.  They are also amenable to gradual 
changes that can be deepened as they are subjected to further revi-
sions.  Thus, we can try to identify combinations of rules that could 
positively transform the current institutional expression of the 
closed shop.   
To see this point more clearly it would be useful to compare the 
Mexican collective-bargaining system with that of the United 
States.  While the Mexican system exhibits most elements of a cor-
poratist model, the U.S. system is based on a contractualist mod-
el.124  Tamara Lothian has made a compelling comparative analysis 
of the United States and Brazilian collective bargaining regulatory 
systems, contrasting the U.S. contractualist model with the Brazili-
an corporatist one.125  Her typology is useful to underscore the dif-
ferent objectives that each model pursues and the institutional set-
ting each has developed to achieve such aims.  Even though she 
 
124 For additional studies on the contractualist nature of American labor law, 
see Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971), Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Con-
cept of Contract, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 829 (1948), and Klare, supra note 52.  For an ex-
cellent study of the Mexican, corporatist model of labor regulation, see generally 
Graciela Bensusán, EL MODELO MEXICANO DE REGULACIÓN LABORAL (2000) See also 
Stephen Zamora et al., MEXICAN LAW (2004).  I use these characterizations without 
passing a value judgment over them.  Each of these ideal types has its virtues and 
its problems.  Even though some analysts would be tempted to attribute to the 
contractualist system the economic and democratic advantages of the United 
States over Mexico in the comparison between these two countries, there is noth-
ing inherent in the types of regulation that would warrant this conclusion.  Many 
European countries, for instance, have a corporatist collective-bargaining system 
and enjoy vibrant democratic societies and high levels of economic growth. 
125 See Lothian, supra note 70, at 1011–34. Compare Stanley A. Gacek, Revisiting 
the Corporatist and Contractualist Models of Labor Law Regimes: A Review of the Brazil-
ian and American Systems, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1994) (accepting Lothian’s ideal 
types but arguing that the emerging labor movement in Brazil was anti-
corporatist and “contractualist” and that the American labor law system was a 
“deviant” case of contractualism), with Tamara Lothian, Reinventing Labor Law: A 
Rejoinder, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1749 (1995) (reasserting her original characterization 
and furthering the analysis of a hybrid model composed of unitary unionization 
and independent union structure). 
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focuses on the case of Brazil to illustrate the corporatist system, her 
analysis can be extended to other countries, which, like Mexico, are 
a species of the corporatist genre. 
These models present interesting points of contrast.  The con-
tractualist model is characterized by voluntary and pluralist unio-
nization.  Collective agreements are modeled after individual con-
tracts and labor relations and assume a private exchange dictated 
by individual self-interest.  In contrast, the corporatist model 
presents a unified and comprehensive union structure in which all 
workers are enrolled.  The union structure is subordinated to the 
national government’s guidance, and it is an integral part of the 
public organization of society.126 
In Lothian’s analysis, the contractualist model exhibits a rela-
tively moderate economistic style of industrial militancy—
concentrating on obtaining wages and benefits—rather than on the 
organization of the economy and society.  The corporatist model in 
turn, favors the extremes of passivity and prostration when a ro-
bust authoritarian system is in place or politicized and all-inclusive 
labor militancy when that system begins to fracture, in which 
worker’s economic demands become inseparable from attempts to 
transform society’s basic institutional structure.127 
It might be helpful to compare these models according to how 
they regulate two main aspects of labor relations:  1) worker organ-
ization leading to the formation of unions, and 2) the regulation of 
union relations once they have been constituted.  Union relations 
can be external—establishing the bargaining framework between 
unions and employers, and internal- establishing the conditions of 
the union governance system. 
On the first aspect of the collective bargaining regulation, 
namely, worker organization to form a union, the contractualist 
model insists on the free will of the parties.  In the United States, 
government intervention at this stage aims to ensure that the em-
ployees have freely agreed to be represented by a union without 
any coercion.  Unions are not given any privileges in the process 
and they have to bear the burden and the cost of a union organiz-
 
126 See Lothian, supra note 70, at 1008. 
127 See id. at 1035 (“My argument is that the link between unions and the state 
establishes a fulcrum for the swing between the extremes of politicization and 
complacency.”). 
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ing drive under uneven conditions against employer resistance.128  
By contrast, the corporatist model offers mechanisms that facilitate 
the organization of workers. In Mexico, union recognition does not 
depend on certifying the existence of workers’ majority will to 
form a union. Union organization is facilitated by a set of statutory 
norms setting out the requirements to form a union.  When em-
ployees fulfill these requirements the state is supposed to automat-
ically recognizes the union.129  
 
128 In the United States, the employer has a legal obligation not to interfere 
with the formation and administration of labor unions and to bargain in good 
faith with a union that represents the majority of employees.  See National Labor 
Relations Act §§ 8(a)(2), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).  In practice, these obligations 
have proven weak in the face of employer resistance, both legal and illegal.  See 
PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 111-12 (1990).  Under current law, 
employers can effectively express their opposition to union organizing, compel 
employees to attend meetings where the employer voices its objections and ex-
clude union representatives from the firm premises.  The law has also been inef-
fective at providing remedies for illegal employer opposition to unionization, 
such as anti-union discharges.  Finally, the employer’s right to permanently re-
place workers engaged in a strike presents a huge obstacle for unions to organize 
and for employees to decide to join a union.  Estlund, supra note 62, at 1536-38.  
See also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION 
TO CO-REGULATION 165-166 (2010); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union 
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 557 (1993) (ar-
guing that employers have a right to compel employees to hear their opposition to 
unionization in a “captive audience” meeting while union representatives have no 
correlative right).  In addition, employer resistance has been found to influence 
worker desire to unionize the workplace in the first place.  See WHAT WORKERS 
WANT, supra note 61, at 86-87 (2006).  See also Gacek, supra note 125, at 88–90 (ar-
guing that in practice, workers’ formation of a union heavily depends upon an 
employer’s willingness to recognize the union).  The employer can require a re-
presentation election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board.  Employ-
ers’ aggressive anti-union campaigns between the time of the union petition to the 
NLRB and the election are a well-documented practice.  See generally Paul C. Wei-
ler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (arguing that the only way to effectively implement 
the NLRA’s mission is through “instant elections” as applied in the Canadian la-
bor law regime); Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the 
Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, 
Striking a Balance] (discussing employers’ use of hardball tactics to prevent the at-
tainment of first contracts by newly certified unions).  It is worth noting that Can-
ada, which also has a predominantly contractualist system, presents a different 
face.  In most provinces, a union is certified without a representation election.  See, 
e.g., Weiler, supra, at 1806–19 (comparing the United States and Canada and dis-
cussing how not requiring a representation election has positive effects on unioni-
zation). 
129 In the case of Mexico, a minimum of twenty employees is required to ap-
ply for union registration.  There is no majority vote requirement for union forma-
tion.  If the union fulfills the legal requirements, which include submitting copies 
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Regarding the second aspect of the collective-bargaining sys-
tem—that of union activity once it is recognized- there are impor-
tant points of contrast too.  At the level of unions’ relations with 
employers, reaching a collective agreement has turned out to be 
very hard for unions in the United States despite employers’ legal 
duty to bargain in good faith.  In the United States even when a un-
ion has obtained recognition to be the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative, there is no assurance that it will actually get an agree-
ment.130  In the case of Mexico, the employer has a legal obligation 
to enter into a collective agreement at the union’s request. If the 
employer refuses to sign an agreement the union can exercise its 
right to strike. 131  Since the employer has no right to replace em-
ployees engaged in a strike, unions can exert considerable pressure 
to reach an agreement.  
The contractualist model thus places burdens on workers’ col-
lective organization and bargaining.  Workers spend significant 
energy and resources trying to organize and obtain recognition. In 
the United States, scholars have harshly criticized the collective 
bargaining system for favoring employers by imposing numerous 
 
of the minutes of the constitutive meeting, members’ contact information, union 
by-laws, and of the minutes of the meeting in which the union’s board of directors 
was elected, the administrative authority cannot deny registration.  See Ley Feder-
al del Trabajo [LFT] [Federal Labor Law], arts. 364–366, Diario Oficial de la Fede-
ración [DO], 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.). 
130 See Weiler, Striking a Balance, supra note 128, at 354 (calculating that 
“slightly more than 60% of newly certified units achieve a [first] collective agree-
ment”); Catherine Fisk, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act, 
70 LA. L. REV. 47, 56 (2009): 
Although Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA imposes a duty to bargain in good 
faith, the United States Supreme Court long ago decided that the Board 
lacks the authority to force a recalcitrant-even an illegally recalcitrant-
party to reach agreement.  Nor will the Board impose monetary remedies 
to compensate for an employer's illegal refusal to bargain, even when it 
is quite clear what monetary harm occurred.  All it will do is order the 
party that bargained in bad faith to bargain more and to do so in good 
faith.  An employer determined to resist the lawful right of its employees 
to unionize and bargain collectively can thwart their rights simply by re-
fusing to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Eventually, after 
the employer drags out the negotiations for years and makes plain its re-
fusal to enter into an agreement with the union, the employees or the un-
ion give up. The employer can then withdraw recognition and remain 
union-free. 
Id. 
131 See Ley Federal del Trabajo [LFT] [Federal Labor Law], art. 387, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.). 
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hurdles on workers’ organization and ability to bargain.132  As ac-
tivists and NGOs have documented, the U.S. model prevents 
workers from associating to pursue their interests.  They claim that 
the U.S. labor law system fosters and enables practices that infringe 
upon internationalized rights of freedom of association, even 
though many of these practices are, in fact, legal under United 
States law.133  Thus, many voices appeal for labor law reform that 
would enable workers to organize effectively.134   
Finally, at the level of union internal governance, the contrac-
tualist system grants unions more independence over their internal 
affairs than the corporatist one.  In the United States, the govern-
ment has passed regulation aimed at assuring the internally demo-
cratic functioning of unions.135  However, this is qualitatively a dif-
ferent kind of relation than the one existing in Mexico where the 
government intervenes to control union leadership, influence un-
ion activity and ensure union support of government policy.136   
 
132 See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 128; ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, 
supra note 128.  See also Lothian, supra note 125, at 1758. 
The Contractualist regime of purely voluntary unionization consumes 
the greater part of the effort of the labor movement in the struggle to un-
ionize, and to maintain union, in the face of employer coercion and se-
duction. It also helps to give a purely economistic tilt-wages and benefits 
rather than power in an outside the workplace to whatever labor mili-
tancy it allows to subsist. 
Id. 
133 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DISCOUNTING RIGHTS: WAL-MART’S VIOLATION 
OF US WORKERS’ RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 16-23 (May 2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0507/ (finding that although Wal-Mart 
often violates labor laws, a considerable number of the firm’s aggressive anti-
union practices are legal in the United States). 
134 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach 
to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010).  For an example of 
legislative reform, see Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. 
(2009); AFL-CIO, available at http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunionvoiceatwork 
/efca/(last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (urging support for the Employee Free Choice Act 
and introducing the AFL-CIO’s labor law reform proposal and its main lobbying 
agenda).  
135 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 amended 
the NLRA to include provisions that regulate the internal affairs of unions.  The 
Landrum-Griffin Act requires that unions periodically hold elections for local and 
national union officers, and that union members be assured a right to vote, to run 
for union office, and to comment upon and nominate candidates.  Additionally, 
the Act imposed heavy reporting requirements on unions regarding their internal 
financial affairs.  
136 The government intervenes in the life of unions in several ways.  One not-
able example is the “toma de nota” (“taking of note” or legal acknowledgment). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SANTOS.DOC 11/23/2010 3:55 PM 
178 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
4.3. Rearranging Elements of the Collective Bargaining Systems 
The Mexican collective bargaining system could thus seek to 
preserve one important aspect of the corporatist system, namely 
the easiness of workers to organize, form and maintain unions, 
while adopting some elements of the contractualist system such as 
the independence of the union system from the government. To the 
extent that compulsory unionization, in the form of the closed 
shop, can enhance workers’ capacity to organize, it is an institution 
that could be worth retaining. 
In this sense, the Mexican system can preserve its social objec-
tives, modifying the perverse incentives that have given rise to cur-
rent practice.  It can uphold the objective of easing the process of 
organization and shielding employees from employers’ resistance. 
At the same time, in response to democratic aspirations, the gov-
ernment’s control in the determination of union existence and its 
intervention on union life could be removed.  The analysis begins 
to take an altogether different form.  It is no longer a discussion 
about the closed shop in isolation, but considered in context, as it 
interacts with other institutional arrangements in the system.  It is 
also an analysis that demands—attentive to the neoliberal criti-
ques—a consideration of the potential economic consequences of 
any particular institutional combination.  
Consider now the institutional backdrop against which the 
closed shop currently operates, generating an unflattering list of 
perverse results. High on the list of problems is the process of un-
ion registration.  As it is currently established, the Ministry of La-
bor discretionarily decides whether a union meets the minimum 
legal requirements of membership and internal organization and 
ultimately whether to grant registration or not.  Thus, unions that 
are not politically favored by the Ministry have a hard time being 
officially recognized.  At the same time, the Ministry can recognize 
 
Article 377, section II of Mexico’s Federal Labor Law (“LFT”) requires unions to 
“communicate to the authority with whom they are registered, within a period of 
ten days, the changes of their leadership and modifications of the statutes, accom-
panied by two authorized copies of the respective documents.”  Article 692, sec-
tion IV of the LFT states: “the representatives of the unions shall accredit their 
personality with the certification extended by the Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Welfare, or the Local Conciliation and Arbitration Board, once the union leader-
ship has been registered.” See Ley Federal del Trabajo [LFT] [Federal Labor Law], 
arts. 377, 692, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 1 de Abril de 1970 (Mex.). In 
practice, the government uses this mechanism to oppose leaders it regards as hos-
tile and favor those who will be supportive of its policies. 
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a union that has no real membership.  This Ministry is also in 
charge of certifying that a union is the title-holder of a collective 
agreement, monitoring elections whenever there is a challenge to 
an incumbent union, and also serves as a depository of such 
agreements.  Paradoxically, the Ministry zealously keeps the regi-
stry of unions and does not disclose this information. 
Some scholars and independent unions have proposed the cre-
ation of an independent registry, in charge of certifying union exis-
tence and certifying title over collective agreements.137  Such a regi-
stry would be transparent, making all this information available to 
the general public.  The registry would also be in charge of moni-
toring union voting, both for important decisions regarding union 
actions, such as initiating a strike or for challenges to incumbent 
unions.  At present, voting generally takes place under conditions 
of extreme intimidation and pressure, with no secret ballots, so that 
workers cannot express their wishes freely.  These conditions favor 
the incumbent traditional unions, often in alliance with employ-
ers.138 
Finally, the authority in charge of hearing disputes arising from 
these matters is the labor Conciliation and Arbitration Board, com-
prised of representatives from government, employers and tradi-
tional unions who are likely to be biased against independent un-
ions.  Some scholars have argued for the need to substitute these 
administrative tribunals with new labor courts, which would be 
part of the judiciary branch rather than the executive.  Independent 
judges would sit on these courts, removing its formerly tripartite 
character, but also the vices and biases that developed with it. 
A discussion about these different categories of the collective 
bargaining regime would seek to bring about a substantive democ-
racy and not only a formal one.  The goal would be to guarantee 
the effective power of workers’ freedom of association, the relative-
ly equal bargaining between unions and firms, and an accountable 
union representation.  Such a discussion would consider what 
would be effective ways to achieve a union governance system 
where the leadership is won by competition and remains open to 
 
137 See Graciela Bensusán, Una Reforma Laboral para la Libertad, la Democracia y 
la Transparencia sindicales; la Agenda Mínima, in LIBERTAD SINDICAL 89 (Alfonso 
Bouzas et al. eds., lst ed. 1999). 
138 Id.; see Arturo Alcalde Justiniani, Hacia Una Concertación Laboral Transpa-
rente y Responsable, in LIBERTAD SINDICAL 73 (Alfonso Bouzas et al. eds., lst ed. 
1999) (suggesting the creation of an independent agency to monitor union elec-
tions modelled after the Federal Electoral Institute). 
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challenges—where unions compete fairly with one another and 
where the government remains disentangled from union life and 
union decisions. 
This Article warns against resorting to “exit” or the ability of 
employees to opt out from unions under the negative right to free-
dom of association, as if it was the obvious solution to the many se-
rious problems of collective bargaining.139 Instead, the Article pro-
poses to give “voice” serious consideration and explore the ways in 
which it can be made effective as a mechanism to improve work-
ers’ economic conditions and their meaningful participation in the 
workplace.  
To reiterate, this Article does not propose the preservation of 
the closed shop as an obvious solution or as desirable on its own. 
Furthermore, the closed shop itself is divisible and it is possible to 
imagine it in different forms.  In the context of Mexico the closed 
shop has two current forms: the exclusion clause by admission and 
the exclusion clause by separation.  One might foresee a scenario of 
keeping the exclusion clause by admission, setting in effect a de-
fault rule of union membership and eliminating the exclusion 
clause by separation, enabling employees to opt out of union 
membership without losing their job.140  This alternative scenario 
would have to be debated and evaluated according to its risks and 
potential effects.141  
 
139 I use the concept of exit and voice as developed by Albert O. Hirschman.  
See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (exploring the comparative advantages 
of exit and voice options as mechanisms of recuperation in deteriorating firms and 
other organizations). 
140 A number of reform proposals have advanced this particular combination. 
See, e.g., Unión Nacional de Trabajadores & Partido de la Revolución Democrática, 
Propuesta de la Unión Nacional de Trabajadores: Anteproyecto Reforma Ley Federal Del 
Trabajo, supra note 72. 
141 For instance, Hirschman argues that in some cases:  
[A] no-exit situation will be superior to a situation with some limited exit 
on two conditions: 1) if exit is ineffective as a recuperation mechanism, 
but does succeed in draining from the firm or organization its more qual-
ity-conscious, alert and potentially activist customer or members; and 2) 
if voice could be made into an effective mechanism once these customers 
or members are securedly locked in.  
HIRSCHMANN, supra note 139, at 55.  The point is that enabling some degree of exit, 
such as requiring union membership as a condition of employment but allowing 
employees to opt out, is not necessarily superior to a no-exit situation.  Which of 
the alternatives is preferable would depend on the particular context, and particu-
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These are all important aspects of the collective bargaining sys-
tem that need to be opened for discussion and debate.  However, 
in thinking of how to reform the Mexican regulation, it would be a 
mistake to get rid of elements of the current collective-bargaining 
system, such as the relative easiness of workers to organize, only 
because they are associated with the corporatist model.  There is 
nothing inherently antidemocratic in facilitating workers’ organi-
zation.  On the contrary, the question would be how we can keep 
elements of the corporatist system that empower workers while at 
the same time instilling genuinely democratic forms of governance.  
4.4. Effects of Bargaining Rules 
Thus far we have considered some of the rules of the game that 
govern the conduct of parties during their bargaining interaction.  
These are, for the most part, labor law rules, which speak directly 
to what parties can or cannot do in their employment relationship.  
Further, these rules establish how workers can coalesce and be rec-
ognized as a union; what mechanisms the union and the employer 
can use to negotiate with one another; which forms of pressure are 
fair play and which ones are not; and what ways are allowed for 
the union to govern itself. 
By delimiting how parties conduct themselves and restricting 
what they can do to one another, these rules produce important 
consequences.  Neoliberal advocates have persistently argued that 
social regulation generally has negative economic effects.  In other 
words, this regulation ultimately hurts the people it intends to 
help. 
Suppose you agree with a proposal to empower workers by 
keeping the closed shop in place while democratizing the collec-
tive-bargaining system.  We would still need to address its eco-
nomic implications analyzing who would be the potential winners 
and losers.  It is on this aspect that the neoliberal critique of social 
regulation needs to be engaged.  Ignoring the critiques in the name 
of preserving a regulation closely related with the country’s na-
tional identity or in the name of the broadly defined working class’ 
progressive cause might offer some consolation, but it does not of-
fer any economic criterion to decide whether indeed the regulation 
is worth preserving. 
 
larly on whether voice could be exercised effectively without an exit threat.  Id. at 
55-56. 
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Neoliberal theory would suggest that by increasing the power 
of unions and their chances to obtain better wages and working 
conditions, the closed shop would be bad for workers.  Unions in-
crease the costs of labor.  They drive prices up through demands 
on higher wages and benefits and consequently decrease hiring, at 
the expense of other workers.142  By making it harder and more 
costly to dismiss workers through the requirement of a “just 
cause,” unions create incentives for firms to hire fewer workers 
than they would otherwise.  As a result, unemployment is higher 
and for those who have lost their jobs, the unemployment duration 
is longer.  The winners, according to this argument, are the already 
unionized workers.  They form a group of insiders creating a high 
entry-barrier for those outside the labor market.  The losers are 
young workers entering the labor force and a large group of wom-
en who, for a variety of economic, social and cultural reasons have 
remained outside the formal labor market. 
Moreover, neoliberal advocates argue that employment condi-
tions that unions negotiate, most notably job tenure and benefits, 
are highly inefficient.  Employers pass the costs of these conditions 
to workers, who ultimately pay for them through lower wages and 
to consumers through higher prices.  This arrangement hurts 
workers who would prefer higher wages instead of the long-term 
job security.  It also hurts young and skilled workers, who could 
otherwise command higher wages and who would be able to move 
around firms if they so wished.  It benefits risk-averse workers, 
who would tend to be senior workers and workers whose produc-
tivity is equal or low relative to their wages. 143  
These are all important criticisms, but are articulated as if labor 
regulation is always bad for workers.  Neoliberal advocates often 
take a simplistic approach to regulation, easily dismissing any reg-
ulatory attempt as an undue intervention in the market.144  Al-
 
142 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 228-47 
(1979) (arguing the benefits unions secure for their members are paid by other 
workers); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the 
New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1399 (1983) (discussing the common 
fear that unions will discriminate to benefit some members at the expense of oth-
ers); see also VELASCO, supra note 46 (arguing that labor regulation produces bad 
economic effects).  
143 See, e.g., Andrew P. Morris, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to 
Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1995-1996). 
144 Legal Realists have long challenged the assumption that the market can 
somehow be free from state intervention.  The very rules that shape the market, 
such as those rules governing property and contract, are a form of regulation in 
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though it is true that sometimes labor regulation can have bad con-
sequences, a general claim that labor regulation always harms 
workers is unwarranted.  As several law and economics scholars 
have shown, it is simply unjustifiable to dismiss labor regulation a 
priori.  A variety of market failures, transaction costs, and externali-
ties145 can call for regulation to make the market more, not less, ef-
ficient.146   
Working within the tradition of neoclassical economics, scho-
lars have disputed the overall negative effects on workers of em-
ployment regulations such as anti-discrimination laws,147 accom-
modation mandates,148 and other mandated benefits.149  These 
scholars call for a more cautious approach, looking at the regula-
tion’s interaction with other laws that affect employment levels 
and wages, paying attention not only to the effects on the protected 
class but also on workers who were not protected by it.  A clearer 
view of the economic effects of regulation on different groups of 
workers, which account for cross-subsidization among them, 
emerges from this analysis.  Thus, the regulation will benefit in-
tended workers via wages or jobs at the expense of other workers 
in some cases.  To be sure, this scholarship does not offer uncondi-
tional support for regulation, but it rejects the a priori dismissal of 
regulation as always bad for employees.  Instead, this scholarship 
offers a clearer map of the policy trade-offs involved. 
 
which the state is deeply implicated and has intervened either by action or omis-
sion.  See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471 (1923); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. 
L. REV. 465, 542 (1988). 
145 For an excellent summary of the failures of individual bargaining to ac-
commodate employers’ and employees’ preferences, see Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, Employment Security:  A Comparative Institutional Debate, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1645 (1995-1996). 
146 See Simon Deakin & Frank Willkinson, Labour Law and Economic Theory:  A 
Reappraisal, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 29 (Hugh Collins 
et al. eds., 2000) (showing that labor regulation can have positive economic effects 
in the market). 
147 See John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment 
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583 (1991-1992); see also John J. Donohue III, 
Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1985-1986). 
148 See Jolls, supra note 117, at 240. See also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination 
and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001-2002). 
149 See generally John J. Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of 
Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897 (2000-2001) 
(analyzing positive and negative economic effects of statutory labor rights). 
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In the area of collective bargaining, scholars have also chal-
lenged the neoliberal contention that unions are inevitably bad for 
the labor market because by increasing wages and non-wage labor 
costs they reduce labor demand and cause unemployment.150  
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has challenged the traditional union cartel 
model, which assumes that unions’ gains in wages and benefits de-
rive from unions’ ability to control the labor supply, to which em-
ployers respond by increasing prices, cutting production, substitut-
ing capital for labor and firing workers.151  Under this model, union 
benefits come at the expense of other workers, consumers, and effi-
ciency.  Instead, Dau-Schmidt shows that unions often obtain their 
gains from employers’ rents and productivity increases—which 
unions contribute to and which constitute the cooperative sur-
plus—and which they divide through collective bargaining.  By 
promoting coordination between workers and employers and pre-
venting waste from escalating economic conflict, labor regulation 
can yield important benefits for both parties. 
All this is not to say that economic efficiency is the only norma-
tive criterion that should be considered when deciding about regu-
lation.152  It is undoubtedly not.  There are of course important con-
siderations of equity, justice, and fairness that are equally worthy 
of attention.  These are values that may conflict with economic effi-
ciency and for which people may legitimately sacrifice greater 
wealth maximization.  The point is to emphasize that even within 
the framework of economic efficiency, regulation cannot be dis-
missed out of hand and can often have positive economic effects 
for the targeted groups.   
In the following section, I turn to a more specific analysis of la-
bor regulation’s distributive consequences in Mexico, looking at 
different groups of workers and paying particular attention to the 
differences between men and women. The effects of these labor 
law rules are no doubt important, but they are only a first step to-
 
150 See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS 
DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE (James T. Bennett and Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 
2007). 
151 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law 
and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 512 
(1992-1993) (highlighting the deficiencies in the traditional monopoly model of 
unions and collective bargaining). 
152 See Gottesman, supra note 103, at 2790-93 (analyzing why wealth redistri-
bution can be a legitimate basis of regulation even if it conflicts with wealth max-
imization). 
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ward understanding the distributional effects of regulation.  Fol-
lowing my proposed model, I consider not only the labor law 
rules, but also rules from different legal regimes that shape the al-
ternatives to the parties’ bargaining situation. 
4.4.1. Winners and Losers Among Workers 
What would be the distributive consequences for different 
groups of workers if we kept the closed shop intact while radically 
democratizing its structure?  This part of the analysis seriously 
considers the neoliberal claim that labor laws may have different 
consequences for different groups of workers, specifically by trying 
to hypothesize such consequences in the specific case of women. 
As a preliminary observation, women in Mexico face discrimi-
nation and other obstacles in the market.  Scholars have docu-
mented important gender disparities in the Mexican labor market.  
These disparities are reflected on several fronts, including the rate 
of women’s participation in the market compared to men’s.  Out of 
an economically active population of 40 million, the gap in the 
economic participation between men and women ages 25-49 was 
about 47% in the period of 1991 to 2003.153  There are important dif-
ferences in job tenure, with women performing considerably more 
part-time and temporary jobs than men.154 
Similarly, there are differences in wages, with women earning 
less on average than men.155  This difference seems to be relatively 
small when similar jobs are compared, controlling for level of skills 
and occupation.156  However, gender comparisons within high-
skilled and well-paid occupations, such as financial services, ap-
pear to show vertical segregation, erecting a barrier that prevents 
women’s access to jobs that are higher in status and wages and are 
usually performed by men.157  What seems to account for overall 
 
153 See Marina Ariza, Mercados de Trabajo Urbanos y Desigualdad de Género en 
México a Principios del Siglo XXI, in LA SITUACIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN MÉXICO 393 (En-
rique de la Garza & Carlos Salas eds., 2003) (noting large disparity in economic 
earning power between men and women).  
154 See id. at 393-95 (analyzing the differing job prospects of men and women). 
155 See Teresa Rendón, Empleo, Segregación y Salarios por Género, in LA 
SITUACIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN MÉXICO 137 (Enrique de la Garza & Carlos Salas eds., 
2003). 
156 Even though average wages have leveled in recent years, this seems to be 
due more to a general decrease in wages of men than a dramatic increase in wom-
en’s wages.  Id. at 138–39. 
157 See id. at 139. 
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wage asymmetry is significant occupational segregation, which re-
sults in women doing jobs that, on average, have lower wages?158   
Gender disparities are especially high among workers within 
the age group of 25 to 39, which happens to coincide with women’s 
reproductive age.  It is, of course, no coincidence.  Rather, this fact 
shows crudely the tension between reproductive care work on the 
one hand, and market work on the other.159  Labor market pros-
pects for women decrease most dramatically during their repro-
ductive and child rearing age, showing that for market purposes, 
this work is still a liability for women. 
How are unions implicated in the perpetuation of these gender 
patterns?  And if unions have a negative influence in this regard, is 
the abolition of the closed shop in particular likely to improve 
women’s condition in the market?  I believe that the answer to this 
question is “no.”  While it may be true that traditional labor regula-
tion may have assumed a traditional breadwinner/homemaker 
household,160 protecting the wages and interests of its male mem-
 
158 See id. at 129, 137-38; Ariza, supra note 153, at 399. 
159 Ariza, supra note 153 at 391. 
160 While this breadwinner-homemaker model may have produced positive 
economic results for the household in the past, it created serious disparities for 
women.  See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN IN AMERICA 362 
(1985) (concluding that divorced wives’ standard of living fell by 73% during the 
first year following a divorce, while divorced men’s standard of living rose by 
42%).  Weitzman’s figures have been discredited due to errors in her data set, but 
corrected estimates still show an important disparity in post-divorce incomes:  
men’s rise 10%, while women’s drop 27%.  See Richard R. Peterson, A Re-
Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 532 (1996) 
(conducting an analysis of Weitzman’s data and concluding that the results are in 
error).  But see Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce:  
Vanishingly Small?, 33 FAM. L.Q. 111, 131 (1999) (arguing that the gender gap in 
post-divorce incomes has been “seriously overestimated” because the studies 
have not considered disparate taxation benefits and shared child expenses).  Fur-
thermore, the economic conditions that supported the breadwinner-homemaker 
model no longer seem to hold today.  See, e.g., VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST 
FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988); Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, Introduction to 
Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism, in PRIVATIZATION, LAW, AND THE 
CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 3, 26 (Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman eds., 2002) (con-
cluding that, because men’s average wages are declining, women are forced to 
take on feminized employment opportunities that only exacerbate income inequa-
lities); ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT:  WORKING 
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 241 (1989) (pointing out the changing na-
ture of women’s lives with the advent of service jobs and the need for their wages 
at home); KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (analyzing fundamental 
changes in the workplace due to the emergence of the new economy); BARBARA 
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bers to the exclusion of female co-workers, the abolition of the 
closed shop would not necessarily benefit female workers.  In fact, 
it would make it harder for female workers to unionize and, con-
sequently, it would be harder for workers to demand better work-
ing conditions.   
Neoliberals, however, argue that flexibility would create part-
time or fixed-term contracts that would better fit women’s needs, 
specifically women who cannot take on full-time or permanent 
jobs.  This argument only glosses over the problem, though.  The 
reason why these women do not take those jobs in the first place is 
largely a response to the issues that emerge from the interaction 
between labor law and other legal regimes.  These issues include 
those raised by family law and the social norms that consider care-
giving the exclusive duty of women.  
Moreover, labor flexibility may hurt women, particularly those 
bearing housework responsibilities, performing childcare, or plan-
ning to have children.  Under current legislation, which makes 
permanent employment contracts the norm, employers are obliged 
to provide for a twelve-week paid maternity leave for female em-
ployees, which they do through their contribution to social securi-
ty.161  Employers also pay a share of their employees’ compulsory 
health insurance. 162  Doing away with these benefits—which are 
reflected in current overall wage levels—would shift the financial 
costs of child bearing and childcare to households with children or 
to women themselves.163  Making labor rules more flexible might 
 
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA 224 (2001) 
(providing a journalist’s perspective on the impact of welfare reform on women 
by going undercover as a low-paid worker). 
161 See Ley Federal del Trabajo [LFT] [Federal Labor Law], as amended, art. 
170-II, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 174 de Enero de 2006 (Mex.) (mandat-
ing the right to maternity leave six weeks prior to birth and six weeks after birth); 
LFT art. 170-III (Mex.) (mandating that maternity leave shall be extended for the 
time necessary if a woman is unable to work because of pregnancy or delivery); 
Id. art. 170-V (Mex.) (mandating the right of individuals on maternity leave to re-
ceive full pay for the twelve-week period refered to in art. 170-II and half pay for a 
limited period of sixty days after that in case of incapacity). 
162 See Ley del Seguro Social [LSS] [Social Security Law], as amended, art. 15, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 7 de Septiembre de 2009 (Mex.) (outlining 
employers obligations to provide insurance to their employees). 
163 See KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING:  LAW, DISTRIBUTION 
AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 19 (2002) (arguing that women are systematically 
disadvantaged economically because labor markets are not arranged in a manner 
that permits an individual to effectively perform both types of labor- market work 
and childcare duties). 
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encourage employers to hire more women in part-time jobs with 
no benefits.  However, this could ultimately force mothers to bear 
serious costs by requiring them to take several part-time jobs while 
also performing care-giver duties.  To the extent that firms under-
go restructuring to cut benefits, the change would also affect wom-
en already in the market who would otherwise enjoy maternity 
leave and childcare benefits.164   
In fact, as de facto labor flexibility has spread in the country, 
many married women find themselves working in the household 
and in the market.  Often, these flexible jobs are poorly paid and 
offer no benefits.  Labor flexibility, understood as the elimination 
of employers’ responsibility for workers’ benefits and protections, 
might encourage employers to hire more women.  However, flex-
ibility often becomes a synonym for precariousness.165  Making la-
bor laws more flexible may end up driving down wages and work-
ing conditions for the male insiders without necessarily making 
things better for women.  Married women would find themselves 
needing to enter the labor market because their husband’s wages 
are no longer enough to support the household, yielding negative 
consequences for their housework and the duration and quality of 
their childcare.   
Flexibility will shift these costs, which employers currently 
bear, or which are absorbed by male and female workers as a 
whole, to mothers and would-be mothers.  Disentangling the costs 
of workers’ benefits from employers does not entail the elimination 
of such costs but merely shifts them to other actors.  Even if one ac-
cepts the argument that reducing costs for employers may encour-
age them to create more jobs, this should not mean that the costs 
should be borne by workers alone or by female workers more spe-
cifically.  Perhaps those protections could be provided in a differ-
ent form and paid by different actors through the state via social 
security.  The point is that flexibility is a short word for a shift in 
costs and that we need to have an idea about how those costs 
would be distributed and what effects they would have. 
 
164 See id.; Fudge & Cossman, supra note 160, at 27 (“The problem . . . is that 
women’s greater independence has not been matched by greater economic equali-
ty, especially when there are children to care for.”). 
165 See generally Guy Standing, Global Feminization Through Flexible Labor:  A 
Theme Revisited, 27 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 583 (1999) (arguing that the changing 
character of labor markets around the world led to a rise in female labor force par-
ticipation, a relative if not absolute fall in men’s employment, and a “feminiza-
tion” or deterioration of many jobs traditionally held by men). 
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As far as unionization is concerned, even if we recognize the 
need for making part-time and fixed-term jobs more widely avail-
able, there is no reason to couple this with obstacles to unioniza-
tion.  Unions can make an important difference.  They can help 
provide better compensation and conditions in flexible jobs, which 
would benefit women by spreading the costs of the benefits ob-
tained by unions among all the members.  Thus, the solution is not 
to make union organization and collective bargaining more diffi-
cult in order to achieve a precarious flexibility that would suppo-
sedly benefit women. 
Union practices that disfavor women need to be confronted 
too.  The closed shop gives considerable power to the union in 
firms’ hiring decisions.  In this and other aspects of unions’ internal 
governance, there is potential to establish more effective remedies 
for women who are discriminated against.  But these changes will 
more likely come with effective unions, which are pressed to com-
pete for membership, and with leaders who are democratically 
elected.   
In contrast, a gender-conscious radical democratization of un-
ions might do more to unravel the traditionally patriarchal profile 
of unions.  It would require that unions take positive measures—
like representational quotas—to include women in their ranks, 
and, most importantly, it would require them to include traditional 
“women’s problems” in the core of their agenda.  Included in this 
project would be the need to specify and prohibit as discriminatory 
a variety of practices such as:  encroachments on women’s privacy 
(requests for no-pregnancy certificates when hiring or considering 
promotion, for example), reprisals against women who take ma-
ternity leave (e.g. refusal to reinstate the women to the same job 
position after maternity leave) or family care leave, and sexual ha-
rassment.166 
However, even if we were to retain the closed shop with this 
gender conscious radical democratization component, it is unlikely 
that it would positively affect women without a transformation of 
the host of background legal regimes and social norms that cur-
rently affect women’s bargaining position in the market.  The next 
 
166 See Patricia Kurczyn Villalobos, Propuestas para Reformar la Ley Federal del 
Trabajo en Temas de Equidad y Género [Proposals to Amend the Federal Labor Law in 
regard to Equity and Gender Concerns], in LA REFORMA LABORAL QUE NECESITAMOS  
[LABOR REFORM WE NEED] 145 (José Alfonso Bouzas Ortiz ed., 2004) (discussing 
ways to promote gender equality in the labor market).   
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step in the analysis is to turn to these background regimes.  What 
becomes relevant is a legal realist analysis that takes into account 
not only labor regulation, but also other legal regimes, like family 
law, that form the background against which labor rules operate.167  
This is the analysis to which I now turn.   
4.4.2. Considering Background Legal Regimes 
Neoliberals seem to assume that if labor regulations were made 
more flexible, women would automatically benefit.  They believe 
that easing the barriers to entry in the labor market, either direct-
ly—with part time and temporary contracts—or indirectly—by 
eliminating firing restrictions—would allow women to enter the 
labor market as easily as men.168  However, it may be that even 
after lowering these barriers, women find it harder than men to get 
jobs equivalent to those offered to men.  Or, even if they get the 
jobs, they might find it harder to keep them.  In this regard, neoli-
berals fail to see that it is the combination of labor rules and other 
legal norms that produce such inequitable results for women.  
Consider, for instance, those norms that create incentives for wom-
en to marry and perform care-giving work as opposed to entering 
the labor market.  These norms also assume the marriage as a life-
term contract.  We would need to look at the incentives created by 
family-law rules concerning marriage, divorce, property regimes 
within marriage, property partition upon divorce, child care re-
sponsibilities, alimony rules, and so on.  Then we would need to 
analyze how these rules interact with labor laws to create different 
incentives for men and women, and for different kinds of women. 
We might find that married women have strong incentives to 
stay at home.  They bear disproportionate legal and social respon-
sibilities for housework and childcare relative to men.  To the ex-
tent that men can financially compensate women for their contri-
bution to household production, women have fewer economic 
incentives to enter the labor market.  In addition, family rules that 
consider wealth accumulated during marriage as the product of 
only the wage earner provide additional incentives against di-
vorce.  At the same time, women who do enter the market are dis-
 
167 For an analysis of the immigration legal regime as providing a back-
ground upon which labor laws operate, see Alvaro Santos, Working Borders:  Link-
ing Debates about Insourcing and Outsourcing of Capital and Labor, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
691, 732-36 (2005).  
168 See, e.g., DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 42, at 36–38. 
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advantaged when competing with other women or men who do 
not perform home or care work.  In the market, employers rarely 
try to accommodate women who perform care-giving work be-
cause that entails greater costs.169 
What effect would the abolition of the closed shop have for 
women seeking to enter the labor market against these background 
conditions?  It would probably be mixed.  Neoliberals are probably 
right to say that more “flexibility” would allow more women to 
find work, but the work that they would find would be part-time 
and lacking the benefits to grant them independence from an addi-
tional wage earner.  By contrast, abolishing the closed shop might 
actually hurt married women with children who rely on their 
spouse’s wage for sustenance and might force them into this strati-
fied market for part-time, precarious work. 
I do not mean to suggest that there is a consensus on what is 
best for women, let alone what kind of legal arrangement would be 
most desirable.  Feminists reach different conclusions on how the 
market and the family should interact depending on their views 
about what is best for women and how society should be orga-
nized.170  There is of course no easy answer to these questions.  But 
if we are concerned about how labor regulation and its interaction 
with other legal regimes affect women, we need to raise them.  The 
 
169 See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000) (discussing ways to alleviate the con-
flict between domestic and workplace responsibilities by altering labor market 
opportunities); Chai R. Feldblum & Robin Appleberry, Lawmaking:  A Case Study of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, in THE WORK AND FAMILY HANDBOOK:  MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, METHODS, AND APPROACHES (Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes et 
al. eds., 2006) (discussing the Medical Leave Act and its effect on the domestic en-
vironment).  For an example of proposals to make the workplace more flexible 
and accommodate it to the needs of women and families, see NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CENTER, PUBLIC 
POLICY PLATFORM ON FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS (Nat’l Adv. Comm’n on 
Workplace Flexibility 2010), available at http://workplaceflexibility2010.org 
/images/uploads /reports/report_1.pdf. 
170 See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing for direct public sup-
port of care work but not through marriage); Robin L. West, Do We Have a Right to 
Care?, in THE SUBJECT OF CARE:  FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY 88-114 (El-
len K. Feder & Eva Feder Kittay eds., 2003) (advocating for a publicly supported 
right to care).  But see Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie?  A Few Troubling 
Questions about Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be 
Shifted, 76 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 173, 588 (2000-2001) (expessing reservation about the 
idea that care work should be publicily supported); Vicky Shultz, Life’s Work, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000) (reasserting the centrality of market work for women).  
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debate about labor law reform—that is, the reform of the labor 
market—cannot omit an analysis of how the market interacts with 
the family.  There is no doubt that different groups in society 
would hold different views.  But the debate needs to highlight 
what the stakes are and press those groups to make their views 
clear.  
4.5. The Effects of Labor Regulation in the Country’s Economic 
Growth 
The model I propose, based on an intra-class and inter-gender 
distributional analysis that explores how labor regulation has af-
fected different groups of workers, takes seriously the first aspect 
of the neoliberal critique to social regulation.  There is a second as-
pect of the neoliberal critique that is concerned with the general 
negative impact of labor regulation on the country’s economic per-
formance.  If it is correct, then retaining the closed shop might have 
negative effects on the country’s growth and be undesirable after 
all.  The desirability of the closed shop would ultimately depend 
on whether the economic consequences of unions are generally 
negative.  We would need to evaluate whether the economic bene-
fits of having effective unions are outweighed by the benefits of 
having fewer and weaker unions. 
Neoliberal advocates argue that labor regulation has impeded 
the country’s economic growth.  They do not support the existence 
of unions as negotiating parties because they increase labor costs 
by entering into collective agreements that raise wages, benefits 
and working conditions.  Neoliberals argue that a rigid regulation 
also scares away investment, both domestic and foreign.  Accord-
ing to this view, the end result is a huge opportunity cost in eco-
nomic growth.  In contrast, countries that have liberalized their la-
bor regulations, they argue, fare better.  Flexible labor laws 
contribute to a favorable “investment climate,” which attracts new 
firms.  Furthermore, existing firms also become more productive 
and competitive, which helps create jobs and makes the economy 
as a whole grow.  Thus, neoliberals conclude with a familiar argu-
ment regarding the overall effects of labor regulation, just articu-
lated at a more general level:  rigid labor regulation hurts the coun-
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try’s economic performance and, as a result, workers’ prospects for 
more and better jobs.171   
These claims have been met with powerful criticism that chal-
lenges both the theoretical conclusions and empirical evidence of 
the neoliberal arguments.172  Summarizing the state of the debate, 
labor economist Richard Freeman argues that critics of the ortho-
doxy have successfully demonstrated that the data is more ambi-
guous than what neoliberal supporters maintain.173  
More importantly, some economists have highlighted that la-
bor regulation can enhance efficiency by reducing transaction costs 
and increasing productivity.174  The initial confidence in the neoli-
beral arguments has waned in light of these theoretical disagree-
 
171 See generally Stephen Nickell, Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: 
Europe versus North America, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 55 (1997) (arguing that labor 
market regulation explains the increasing asymmetry between European and U.S. 
employment rates); Stephen Nickell et al., Unemployment in the OECD since the 
1960s:  What do we Know?, 115 ECON. J. 1 (2005) (concluding that labor market regu-
lation explains the increasing asymmetry between European and U.S. employ-
ment rates examining “the proposition that the dramatic long-term shifts in un-
employment seen in the OECD countries over the period from the 1960s to the 
1990s can be explained simply by changes in labour market institutions in the 
same period”). 
172 See, e.g., DEAN BAKER, supra note 49; Gøosta Esping-Andersen & Marino 
Regini, Introduction, in WHY DEREGULATE LABOUR MARKETS? (Gøosta Esping-
Andersen & Marino Regini eds., 2000) (arguing that the deregulatory agenda is 
only tenuously anchored in economic theory or empirical research); See also The 
1996–97 ILO Jobs Report: There’s Plenty of Work to Do!!, THE JOBS LETTER, Dec. 20, 
1996), available at http://www.jobsletter.org.nz/jbl05210.htm (summarizing ILO 
World Employment 1996/97, National Policies in a Global Context, which argues that 
unemployment rates have increased independently of the degree of market regu-
lation). 
173 See Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The 
Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance, 19 INT’L ECON. J. 129, 129–30 
(2005) (arguing that the debate over whether labor institutions impair aggregate 
performance is inconclusive). 
174 See, e.g., DIAMOND ASHIAGBOR, THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY: 
LABOR MARKET REGULATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE 48-50 (2005) (“The normative 
framework supplied by labour law not only reduces transaction costs, but also . . . 
facilitates a higher degree of internal—namely, functional—flexibility and accep-
tance of technological change . . . thus improving productivity and competitive-
ness.”); Christoph F. Buechtemann, Introduction: Employment Security and Labor 
Markets, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 3, 3 (Christoph F. 
Buechtemann ed., 1993) (discussing employment security and stability in relation 
to labor markets noting that unregulated U.S. employment sectors are far from 
efficient). 
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ments and mixed empirical evidence.175  Thus, it is reasonable to 
argue that the a priori claim that labor deregulation—or the dis-
mantling of protections in the form of flexibility—will be necessari-
ly good for the country’s economic performance is unfounded.  
Those proposing reform on the basis of this assumption have im-
portant theoretical challenges and empirical evidence to rebut. 
On the question of unions’ effects on economic growth, there is 
no conclusive evidence that they have a negative influence.176  The 
scholarly debate shows that the unions’ impact on a country’s 
economy is more indeterminate than its proponents and detractors 
usually admit.177  What is clear from the available evidence is that 
the impact varies according to context in which the unions operate, 
a point that Freeman often emphasizes.  In his view, unions are 
“mutable social institutions that operate differently in different in-
stitutional settings.”178 
There are of course less controversial union effects, like de-
creases in wage inequality, low turnover, increases in benefits, and 
decreases in profits.  People might legitimately disagree about 
whether these effects are desirable or not.  These economic effects 
present trade-offs and raise important policy considerations for 
any society thinking about how to reform its labor market institu-
tions.  However, it seems that the neoliberal claim that strong un-
ions have an overall negative effect on the economy has been se-
riously challenged and would not be a sufficient argument against 
a radically democratized version of the closed shop.   
4.6. The Application of the Model to the Mexican Context 
Much has been said about the country’s generous twentieth-
century labor regulation policies.  Social advocates point to its pro-
tections not only as an achievement in and of itself, but as a key 
 
175 Witness the OECD’s retreat from its initial labor flexibility reform agenda 
in the 1994 Job Study to a more ambivalent position about the economic effects of 
labor regulation. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2004, 81 (OECD ed., 2004) (“Evidence of the role played by 
EPL [employment protective legislation] on aggregate employment rates remains 
mixed . . . .”); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2006 (2006).  
176 See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS 
DO?:  A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 
2007) (discussing the effects of unionization on economic performance). 
177 Richard B. Freeman, supra note 62, at 617. 
178 Id. 
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element in the country’s industrialization and development during 
the “Mexican miracle,” also known as “desarrollo estabilizador” or 
stabilizing development.179  Neoliberals decry labor’s costly protec-
tions as impediments to the country’s economic growth. However, 
there is also considerable agreement that enforcement of the law is 
lax.  For social advocates, this is a reason to reinvigorate the social 
protections.  For neoliberal advocates, this is proof that protections 
are too costly and provides all the more reason to deregulate or to 
formalize the flexibility that already exists in practice.  However, 
these claims are in need of serious reconsideration based on the 
analysis of the economy’s situation on the ground. 
The law-on-the-ground in Mexico seems to confirm some of the 
skepticism towards the neoliberal claim that labor law flexibility 
would help create jobs and generate investment and growth.  Scho-
lars have argued that there is already widespread flexibility in 
Mexican labor law institutions and that this flexibility has been 
achieved through gaps in legislation, lack of enforcement, and 
most tellingly, deals between employers and the traditional union 
leadership.180  Even though there is an outcry over the rigidities of 
labor regulation, employers have, in reality, found ingenious and 
effective means of non-compliance.  Weak enforcement of labor 
regulation is due to a variety of factors.  Employers’ bargaining 
power has increased due to the conditions of international compe-
tition where capital can move more easily than labor, especially in 
labor-intensive sectors.  Weak unions are unable to bargain effec-
tively and unrepresentative unions are not interested in ensuring 
labor law enforcement.181  The government does not have the ca-
pacity to ensure closer inspection of labor practices and labor 
courts, which consist of tripartite administrative organs often de-
scribed as captured by the leadership of traditional unions and 
employers. 
 
179 See, e.g., MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 41 (discussing the contribution of orga-
nized labor to the process of industrialization in Mexico).  
180 See ARTURO ALCALDE & BERTHA LUJÁN, COMO VIVEN LA DEMOCRACIA DE 
LOS ABAJO 91, 103 (Jorge Alonso & Juan Manuel Ramírez eds., 1997); see also 
GRACIELA BENSUSÁN, DISEÑO LEGAL Y DESEMPEÑO REAL: INSTITUCIONES LABORALES 
EN AMÉRICA LATINA 326 (2006).  See also Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Re-
form and Economic Development, supra note 50.  
181 See BOUZAS ORTIZ, supra note 120. 
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Furthermore, labor market flexibility also exists in the form of 
worsening wages and working conditions.182  Despite this down-
ward flexibility, gained through a dramatic decrease—often with 
union acquiescence—in real wages and benefit cuts, employment 
growth rates have not increased substantially in the last two dec-
ades.  Even under this flexible scenario, the economy has been un-
able to create jobs for youths becoming economically active. 
On the other hand, the country’s generous labor protections, 
honored largely in the breach, do not seem to have fulfilled their 
ambitious aspirations in recent decades.  Labor regulation has not 
fared well when measured against its self-declared objectives:   
leveling the playing-field between employers and workers, ensur-
ing decent jobs, providing fair treatment in the resolution of con-
flict, and guaranteeing workers’ participation in decisions that con-
cern their workplace.   
One way to measure how much workers have been empo-
wered is to look at what they are usually most concerned about—
wages and benefits.  These results can serve as indicators of how 
even the playing field has been for workers in their negotiation 
with employers over time.  Take, for instance, the overwhelming 
evidence showing a deep decline in real wages during the last 
three decades.183  By 1998, “real wages and real minimum wages 
equaled only an estimated 57.0 percent and 29.5 percent of their re-
spective levels in 1980.”184 Furthermore, the share of wages as a 
percentage of GDP has also fallen sharply, from “40 per cent of 
GDP in 1976 to just 18.9 in 1999.”185 
 
182 See BENSUSÁN, supra note 124 (discussing the decline of protections for 
workers in Mexico); see also ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS, POLARIZING MEXICO: THE 
IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY 160-61 (2000) (quantifying the trends in the 
decline of real wages in Mexico as liberalization of policies progressed).  See gener-
ally Carlos Salas & Eduardo Zepeda, Empleo y Salarios en el México Contemporáneo, 
in LA SITUACION DEL TRABAJO EN MÉXICO 37, 55 (2003) (México: Instituto de Estu-
dios del Trabajo 2003) (discussing the 2001 recession’s effects on Mexican wages 
and employment rates).   
183 See DUSSEL PETERS, supra note 182, at 160-61.  
184 Id. at 161. 
185 Gabriel Palma, Trade Liberalization in Mexico: its Impact on Growth, Employ-
ment and Wages 50 (Int’l Lab. Office: Geneva, Employment Paper No. 2003/55, 
Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_142466.pdf.  See also DUSSEL PETERS, supra 
note 182, at 160: 
Although labor leaders have been able to negotiate their continued par-
ticipation in PRI and the government, the labor movement as a whole 
has lost dramatically.  Wages in the total economy as a percentage of 
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The country’s average economic growth during the period 
1980–2007, although low, has been positive reaching about 2.9%.  
Accordingly, while the economy has grown during the last three 
decades, real wages have dramatically decreased.  This suggests an 
important redistribution of resources from workers to employers 
through the decline in the cost of labor. 186  Using this metric, work-
ers do not seem to have been very effective in negotiating favorable 
wages with employers under a regime meant to empower them. 
Consider employment conditions, as measured by security and 
stability of employment.  How have benefits or guarantees of a 
long-term employment fared?  There is evidence showing a signifi-
cant fall in long-term and well-paid jobs with benefits and a surge 
in the contingent workforce—characterized by part-time or tempo-
rary, low-paid jobs with few or no benefits.  This development may 
reflect an important downsizing of the public sector and the en-
suing elimination of a considerable number of well-paid jobs.  At 
the same time, the private sector has undergone an important 
change as well, with the increasing substitution of stable and se-
cure employment for low-paid and part-time jobs.  Finally, there is 
the rapidly-growing informal sector, composed by hundreds of 
thousands of micro-firms, often family-based, where jobs are high-
ly unstable and offer no benefits.  Thus, using a stability and secu-
rity metric, labor regulation does not seem to have helped workers 
in recent decades either. 
This evidence should force a reconsideration of the neoliberal 
and social positions.  On the one hand, social regulation has failed 
to deliver its promises.  While insisting on further protections or 
tighter enforcement, social advocates often ignore the costs of regu-
lation on the groups they wish to protect.  The neoliberal critiques 
of labor regulation, on the other hand, fail to account for a wide 
 
GDP fell from levels above 40 percent during the 1970s to 31.74 percent 
in 1996.  Similarly, and in spite of significant successes in increasing labor 
productivity in manufac-turing, real wages have continued to decline in 
this sec-tor . . .  Thus, in contrast to 1940–1970, real wages have not in-
creased along with labor productivity. 
Id. 
186  See Enrique Hernández Laos, La productividad en México: Origen y Distribu-
ción 1960–2002, in LA SITUACION DEL TRABAJO EN MEXICO 161, 168-69 (Carlos Salas 
ed., 2006) (arguing that although productivity has remained low in Mexico from 
1988–2002, workers have transferred much of their productivity gains to em-
ployers). 
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range of already existing flexibilities in the labor markets and their 
relative failure in bringing about a cycle of economic growth. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have traced what I see as the three main trans-
national discursive positions in the analysis and debate of labor 
law and labor relations.  Each of these rhetorical positions has an 
intellectual tradition and a legal, theoretical, and doctrinal expres-
sion that allows it to stand on its own as a plausible and coherent 
position from which to view and pass judgment upon the organi-
zation of labor relations. 
Each of these positions translates into the defense of certain 
principles over others (i.e. security or flexibility, welfare or indi-
vidual autonomy) and certain rules over others (i.e. just cause dis-
missal or contract at will, union security clauses or individual free-
dom of association).  My claim is that these three discourses—the 
social, the neoliberal, and the rights-based approaches—have come 
to dominate the way we think about labor relations.  They domi-
nate our discussion in ways that prevent an analysis of labor regu-
lation’s current and future distributional consequences while limit-
ing how we think about our legal institutions. 
The social position so equates current labor regulation and so-
cial protections with progressive politics that to criticize it is to 
challenge the historic aspirations of workers and the labor move-
ment.  The neoliberal position calls for dismantling labor protec-
tions if a country is ever to compete successfully in the global 
economy and achieve prosperity.  It so equates its flexibility reform 
with the market that to challenge its program is to oppose the mar-
ket, as if that was its only possible institutional manifestation.  To 
resist the neoliberal program is to long for the state’s control of the 
economy.  The rights-based approach has so narrowed its aspira-
tions for freedom and democracy to the pursuance of a rights 
agenda that it equates freedom and democracy with the attainment 
of such rights.  To challenge its formalism is to be a supporter of 
the old statist regime. 
It is hard not to get a sense of exhaustion on seeing how these 
conceptual positions dominate the debate.  This impasse is often 
attributed to an unfortunate alignment of political forces, whose 
interests sharply conflict, and to the lack of political will by any 
particular government.  However, my call to transcend these en-
trenched positions is not necessarily intended to urge a specific 
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reform.  Instead, I have sought to draw attention to the blind spots 
in this debate.  I have aimed to transcend the way we think of labor 
regulation and the familiar dogmas we are ready to subscribe to 
because of conceptual comfort or political affiliation. 
This Article shows that these discourses are truly transnational 
in character.  Although these rhetorical positions are often thought 
to be peculiarly local and are sometimes presented as such, they 
are visible in debates about labor law reforms in both developed 
and developing countries.  From labor regulatory debates in the 
United States, China, and Mexico, to debates about the future of 
Social Europe, to debates over the inclusion of labor rights in free 
trade agreements, different groups resort to these rhetorical posi-
tions to advance their interests. 
In this Article, I sought to test each of the three dominant dis-
cursive positions by critiquing their assumptions.  The Article en-
gages in a comparative analysis that highlights the shortcomings of 
each of these positions when put in perspective.  A comparative 
analysis illustrates how in any given country, each of these discur-
sive positions advocates a very narrow repertoire of legal and insti-
tutional options in the regulation of labor relations.  It helps us un-
derstand the contingency of the connection between the goals of a 
discursive position and the present institutional shape it has come 
to inhabit.  By doing a comparative analysis, I show how we can 
imagine alternative legal arrangements and engage in institutional 
experimentation. 
I use a comparison between the collective-bargaining systems 
of the United States and Mexico to show what each country can 
learn from the other in light of ongoing debates about labor reform.  
Mexico struggles with social rules and institutions that intervene in 
unions’ governance structures, undermine unions’ ability and wil-
lingness to represent their members, and imperil workers’ ability 
to participate meaningfully in the workplace.  The United States 
struggles with rules and practices that, in the name of individual 
rights, have substantially weakened unions and made it incredibly 
hard for workers to organize and bargain collectively.  Studies con-
firm that many more workers would like to be represented and 
have some kind of collective voice at the workplace than those who 
are currently represented. 
In the debate about reforming the social rules in Mexico, I ar-
gue that the weaker American social position shows the benefits of 
a collective bargaining system that is disentangled from the gov-
ernment and gives unions greater independence. However, I warn 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
SANTOS.DOC 11/23/2010 3:55 PM 
200 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
against embracing a narrow interpretation of the rights-based ap-
proach that may throw away rules that enable workers’ organiza-
tion and ability to bargain.  Similarly, I claim that the United States 
can widen its restrictive negative-rights approach and thereby lift 
burdensome hurdles for workers’ representation.  It can do so 
while guarding against the interventionist practices that have ossi-
fied unions in Mexico. 
Challenging the assumptions of the three discursive positions 
and relying on a comparative analysis, this Article proposes an al-
ternative analytical framework for thinking about labor regulation.  
This framework takes some key aspirations of each of the discur-
sive positions but rejects the link between such aspirations and its 
prevailing legal and institutional expressions.  For instance, using 
the example of the closed shop in the case of Mexico, my approach 
embraces the rights-based approach’s aspirations to promote 
workers’ freedom and self-government in their organizations.  The 
goal is to foster workers’ expression and participation in decisions 
that concern their workplace, promote organizations that are res-
ponsive to workers’ interests, and ensure accountable leadership.  
However, the rights-based approach’s challenge to the authorita-
rian aspects of the current corporatist collective bargaining system 
need not take the form of particular interpretations of rights, like 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right to freedom of asso-
ciation that undermines the power of workers’ organizations.  The 
point of the proposed framework is to show that there is greater 
room for institutional change and experimentation in the current 
collective bargaining system than the narrow alternatives outlined 
by the rights-based discourse.  Mexico’s labor relations system can 
be radically democratized while transforming, rather than disman-
tling, the power of unions. 
Using this framework, I examine the debate in Mexico and out-
line a model of institutional analysis that embraces the legal real-
ists’ insights about law’s effects on the distribution of power and 
wealth in society.  This approach identifies labor law rules of en-
gagement between employers and workers that dictate how they 
can bargain and what they can do to one another in their employ-
ment relationship.  It also analyzes the actors’ alternatives to the 
bargaining situation provided by other legal regimes that remain 
in the background and shape the parties’ options. 
As an example, I analyzed labor law’s interaction with family 
law in order to understand the current regime’s asymmetrical ef-
fects on men and women and among different groups of women.  
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The analysis does not render concrete policy solutions.  Rather, it 
helps identify the implicit choices embedded in the current legal 
arrangements and in possible alternatives.  What emerges are diffi-
cult choices that reflect different and often competing normative 
views about the relationship between work in the market and in 
the family, how to value it, and who should perform it. 
Finally, this Article is not an attempt to propose, or even de-
fend some specific policy proposals, but rather an attempt to break 
conceptual ground.  What I propose is a different way of analyzing 
and debating labor regulation.  One in which we move away from 
the entrenched prejudices that the discursive positions reflect and 
engage in an exercise of institutional imagination.  I hope to foster 
a mode of analysis that is attentive to questions of distribution—
both inter-class and intra-class—and of efficiency and growth.  A 
mode of analysis that does more to illuminate trade-offs and to 
tease out hard choices, than to obscure them by referring to the old 
myths from which we have learnt to invoke certainty.  
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TABLE 1: DISCURSIVE POSITIONS IN THE                                                          
DEBATE ABOUT LABOR LAW REFORM 
 
I. Employer-Employee Relations (Employment Law) 
 
Position 1 Position 2 
Social / Progressive Law Neoliberal / Economic Efficiency 
Left  Right 
 
 Protection against 
unjust dismissal 
 Reinstatement or 
compensation 
 Severance pay-
ment to em-
ployees excluded 
from protection 
 Employment for 
an indefinite term, 
except under cer-
tain conditions 
 Wages and pro-
motion based on 
seniority 
 Limited working 
hours a day 
 Payment for ex-
tra hours 
 Maternity leave 
 Paid vacation 
 Annual bonus 
 Employment at 
will 
 No right to reins-
tatement or com-
pensation 
 Temporal em-
ployment con-
tracts and trial 
periods 
 Individualization 
of wages 
 Promotion based 
on merit rather 
than seniority 
 Flexibility in 
working hours 
 
 
II. Labor-Management-State Relations (Labor Law) 
Collective Bargaining and Union Representation 
 
 Position 3  
 Rights-Based  
 Center 
 
 
(a) union organization (b) union-employer  
relations 
(c) union-government 
relations 
 
Elections 
Representation 
Compulsory unioniza-
tion 
Limitations to the right 
to strike 
Compulsory arbitration 
Flexibility in negotiating 
below collective agree-
ment  
Limitations to employ-
er’s anti-union practices 
In-firm mixed commis-
sions of productivity and 
distribution of benefits 
Recognition of unions 
Requirements to form 
unions  
Limitations on unions’ 
affiliation to political 
parties 
Discretion to labor au-
thority to declare the 
inexistence or illegality 
of a strike 
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